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Perhaps it is merely a reflection of my interests, but to my mind,
empirical research requires a certain risk-preferent boldness. I like projects
that explore how and why particular businesses make important decisions.
After I identify a topic, I typically try to gather as much qualitative and
quantitative information about it as I can, with the expectation that when I
have learned a great deal about the topic something interesting will emerge
that relates in some important way to an ongoing academic debate. Those
projects usually do not begin with a specific hypothesis to prove or
disprove-often either answer will produce a publishable result. The
hypothesis I wish to test often emerges only after considerable work has
been done, which creates a considerable risk that much effort will be
invested to no productive end.
The success of that type of inquiry obviously is in the eye of the
beholder, and I certainly am biased in thinking that I rarely have
undertaken such a project without finding something that is interesting. It
is common, however, that the results of such projects will be far removed
from my expectations. Specifically, I often begin a project expecting that it
will address a particular question, but finish the project emphasizing a
question that was not on my initial list of inquiries. That is particularly
true in interview-based projects, where the knowledge base I gain
frequently alters my perspective so substantially that my views at the
beginning of the project seem unsophisticated or even odd by the time the
project is complete. A common pattern is to begin with a rough idea of
what the data suggest, do some interviews that generate plausible
hypotheses, and then examine those hypotheses in light of a relatively
targeted data collection.
This is just such a project. Dan Keating asked me to speak at the F.
Hodge O'Neal Symposium to discuss a topic related to IP and bankruptcy.
I responded that I had a data set of failed high-tech companies, together
with data about their patent portfolios that should allow me to investigate
the role of a patent portfolio in determining whether bankruptcy is the
most effective method of liquidating the company. As discussed below,
my research on that topic is inconclusive. Rather, the focus of my paper is
on two topics only loosely related to my original inquiry. The first is a
topic about which I knew almost nothing when I began this work: the use
of a privately arranged assignment for the benefit of creditors ("ABC") as
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a substitute for bankruptcy. In its most unqualified form, my argument is
that California high-tech firms-an important group given the role of
California in high-tech industries-systematically use bankruptcy less than
firms in other states, and that this practice follows directly from California
legal rules that make the process for ABCs more streamlined in California
than it is in other states.
The second, with potentially broader significance, is that data gathered
from the files of the bankrupt firms in the data set provides a unique
glimpse of the capital structure of mid-size business bankruptcies,' which
shows a startling amount of assets and debt both secured and unsecured.
Contrary to the idea that venture-backed firms have simple capital
structures with few claimants, 2 and that they have substantially no
valuable assets when they fail, the average bankrupt firm in the data set
reported tangible assets of more than $20 million, claims of secured
creditors of about $14 million, and claims of unsecured creditors of about
$34 million. That data, together with the results of my interviews about
why those firms seek relief in bankruptcy, supports a much-improved
understanding of exactly what benefits the bankruptcy system provides
that firms could not obtain by contracts among themselves.
The paper proceeds in three steps: a description of the quantitative data
and interviews collected for this paper; statistical analysis of the
quantitative data, informed by the results of the interviews; and discussion
of the theoretical and policy implications of my findings.
I. COLLECTING THE DATA

At the highest level of generality, the purpose of this project is to
contribute to an understanding of how managers of a failing firm choose
among the various options that confront them: When do they file for
bankruptcy? When do they suffer a foreclosure instead of filing for

1. As is evident from the literature surveyed in infra note 3, much of the existing literature
focuses either on very large cases or on a complete sample of cases from a particular district or
districts, a procedure that tends to produce cases much smaller than the cases in the data set I examine
here. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, FinancialCharacteristicsof Businesses
in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 520-21 (1999) (reporting mean assets of business bankruptcy
cases of about $700,000, compared to files here with mean tangible assets of about $22 million).
2. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the
Conceptual Foundations of CorporateReorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 956 (2001) [hereinafter
Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights] (arguing that "debt rarely appears in the capital structure" of a
venture-backed firm and such a firm thus "is not eligible for bankruptcy"); Douglas G. Baird & Robert
K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 781 (2002) [hereinafter Baird &
Rasmussen, The End] ("High-tech ... startups have very little debt.").
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bankruptcy? When do they simply turn the assets over to a lender or equity
investor? When do they voluntarily sell the company to a third party
because they are unable to continue operations? There is of course a
considerable body of empirical literature dealing with what happens to
firms when they file for bankruptcy. 3 There also is a smaller, though welldefined, body of business and finance literature that attempts to build a
model that predicts what firms are likely to file for bankruptcy in the
future.4 There is not, however, any significant work that looks at a data set
of failed firms and analyzes, among a universe of firms that have failed,
which firms choose to file for bankruptcy and which firms choose to use
other mechanisms for dealing with financial distress. 5 Although this work

3. There is a great deal of this work by law professors. For example, Lynn LoPucki has written
on small businesses in the early days of Chapter 11. See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Debtor in Full
Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983)
(Part I); Lynn M. Lopucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (1983) (Part I1) [hereinafter LoPucki, Debtor in Full
Control (Parts I & 11)]. In addition, he has authored a series of papers with William C. Whitford
regarding large-firm bankruptcies in the 1980s. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 669 (1993); Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993); Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11 (1991). Bob Rasmussen
and Douglas Baird have done some recent work about business bankruptcies. E.g., Douglas G. Baird
& Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003) [hereinafter Baird &
Rasmussen, Twilight]. Work by Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook reports results from
their large ongoing empirical study with Terry Sullivan of business bankruptcies. Elizabeth Warren &
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, Empirical Intervention]; Elizabeth
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, supra note 1; Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Searchingfor ReorganizationRealities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257 (1994). Edward R. Morrison also has
written recently with Douglas Baird about business bankruptcies in Chicago. See Douglas Baird &
Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 356 (2001); Edward R.
Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of Small Business Bankruptcies (2003)
(unpublished manuscript, available at www.ssm.com). There is a more general body of work by
scholars in other disciplines. E.g., Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and
Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. EcON. 259 (2003); David C. Smith & Per
Str6mberg, Maximizing the Value of Distressed Assets: Bankruptcy Law and the Efficient
Reorganization of Firms (2004) (unpublished manuscript, availableat www.ssm.com).
4. E.g., Paul Asquith, et al., Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond
Issuers, 109 Q.J. ECON. 625 (1994); Harlan D. Platt & Marjorie B. Platt, Predicting Corporate
FinancialDistress: Reflections on Choice-Based Sample Bias, 26 J. ECON. & FIN. 184 (2002); Edward
I. Altman, Predicting FinancialDistress of Companies: Revisiting the Z-Score and Zeta Models (July
2000) (working paper, available at http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/-ealtman/Zscores.pdf); Matthias Kahl,
FinancialDistress as a Selection Mechanism: Evidence from the United States (Oct. 2002) (working
paper, availableat http://repositories.cdlib.org/anderson/fin/16-01/).
5. The closest paper with which I am familiar is Julian Franks & Oren Sussman, Resolving
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looks more broadly at pre-bankruptcy firms, it provides a valuable
perspective on the theories of the existing literature, largely because it
provides a rare opportunity to see precisely what firms can do without
resorting to bankruptcy.
In related work addressing patenting and venture capital investments, 6 I
used a data set that includes a considerable amount of information about a
specific and important group of failed high-tech firms. Specifically, my
research uses the VentureSource database operated by VentureOne to
collect information about venture-backed firms.7 That database includes a
variety of pieces of information about firms that have received financing
from venture-capital investors. The data are collected by quarterly surveys
of venture-capital investors, supplemented by frequent contacts with
executives at the venture-backed firms. 8 Although the literature makes it
clear that the data are not entirely accurate, they are reasonably complete 9
and commonly used in papers examining the venture-capital industry.10
Moreover, I can think of no reason why the inaccuracies in that data would
introduce any particular bias with respect to the questions I address."'
For this project, the most important data point is an indicator of the
status of the company. One of the status possibilities is that the company is
"out of business."'12 Recognizing the significance of that data point for the

Financial Distress by Way of a Contract: An Empirical Study of Small UK Companies (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=236098).
6. Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry? (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
7. That database is proprietary, but Venture Source kindly has granted me complimentary
access for the purposes of this research.
8. See Dow Jones Venture One, Industry Information: Research Methodology, at
www.ventureone.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). For a published description, see PAUL GOMPERS &
JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 335-37 (1999).
9. See Steven N. Kaplan et al., How Well Do Venture Capital Databases Reflect Actual
Investments (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://gsbwww.uchico.edu/fac/
steven.kaplan/research/kss I .pdf).
10. E.g., GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 8, at 95-124; Antonio Davila et al., Venture-Capital
Financing and the Growth of Startup Firms (Aug. 2002) (working paper, available at http://newsinfo.wustl.edu/pdf/gupta venture-capital.pdf) (last visited Mar. 29, 2004); Sridhar Seshadri et al.,
Venture Capital Investing and the "Calcutta Auction" (2003) (paper prepared for XII International
Torvergata Conference on Banking and Finance, available at http://www.ceistorvergata.it/
conferenze&convegni/banking&finance/XIJconference/1 ODICEMBRE/tucci uniroma2.pdf).
It. The basic problem seems to be that the data set omits a substantial share of the actual
investments. It is not clear what the reason for the omissions is, but given the method by which the
data are collected, it is probably simply a matter of oversight by the persons responding to the
questionnaires.
12. The other options are "acquired/merged," "private and independent," and "publicly held."
The "out of business" category I select for my data set includes firms that have voluntarily sold their
assets in a liquidation context, filed for bankruptcy, or otherwise ceased to exist, but it does not include
firms that have done some form of private workout that leaves the firm intact. In the venture capital
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gap in the literature discussed above, I collected a data set of all the firms
that had three characteristics: (a) they received a venture-capital
investment between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2002; (b) they
were shown as "out of business" in the fall of 2003 when I collected my
data; and (c) they fall within the software, biopharmaceutical, or
communications sectors.13 I limited my analysis to firms that received
financing since 2000 because of the concern that it would be more difficult
to collect information about firms that failed before that time. I selected
those sectors because they are the three largest sectors and the sectors most
closely associated with the "high tech" label. I hoped that by using large
sectors I would be able to investigate the possibility (confirmed in some
ways below) that the attractiveness of bankruptcy differs in significant
ways in different types of businesses.
After I determined the universe of firms that I would study, I collected
from VentureSource various pieces of information about each firm,
including the geographic location of the firm, any former names the firm
may have operated under, the year in which each firm was founded, more
detailed information about each firm's line of business, and two proxies
for the firm's size (employees and total amount of financing received by
the firm). I then supplemented that data with14 information from Delphion
about the size of each firm's patent portfolio.
Next, I turned to the most difficult part of the data collection. Because
the purpose of the project was to understand how firms choose among the

context, for example, it is common for a firm to receive "restart" funding that substantially alters the
direction of the firm. A restart round occurs when a firm's valuation is significantly reduced and the
current investors' stakes are diluted. Restarts have become increasingly common. In years past, they
comprised 1% or less of all deal flow, but in recent years that figure has risen substantially: to 3% in
2002 and 6% in 2003. See VentureOne, Equity Financingsfor US Venture-Backed Companies, by
Industry Group (1997-4Q'2003), at www.ventureone.com/ii/4Q03-Financing- Release.xis (Microsoft
Excel spreadsheet) (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). Functionally, they operate much like a reorganization
in bankruptcy, in the sense that the claims of existing debt claimants often are completely removed and
that the claims of equity claimants that do not contribute new value are likely to be depressed
substantially. See Telephone Interview with Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004); Telephone
Interview with Venture Investor (Apr. 16, 2004). For a thorough analysis of that analogy, see Smith &
Stromberg, supranote 3.
13. 1collected the data in December 2003. Because the data set is updated continuously, it would
be difficult to replicate the exact search. I have downloaded, however, an electronic copy of the entire
VentureSource record for each firm listed as "out of business" as of December 2003.
14. 1 recorded the total number of patents assigned to each firm as of December 31, 2003. In
doing the search, I used the present name and any former names provided by VentureOne. My
experience suggests that such a search does not capture all of the patents assigned to any particular
entity, particularly where a firm has changed names frequently or where the firm acquires a patent at
some time after the issuance of that patent. For purposes of this research, however, those errors are
likely to be unimportant. More importantly, it is not clear that a more replicable method exists for
defining a universe of patents that belong to particular firms.
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alternative methods of liquidation, the basic problem that I faced was how
to categorize the various alternatives to bankruptcy and determine how
often each is used. When the project began, I hoped to produce
quantitative data as to how many firms in the database used various
methods such as a foreclosure, voluntary cessation of business, ABC, or
bankruptcy. Several factors complicated that task.
First, to the extent that the non-bankruptcy methods involve filings, the
filings typically are not easily retrievable or searchable. For example, the
filings for ABCs generally are not in the Secretary of State's Office, but
rather in the offices of city and county clerks. That significantly increases
the number of places at which searches must be conducted. Moreover,
many of those offices do not maintain their records online; in many cases,
they will not respond to search inquiries by telephone or email; in some
cases, they will not even respond to inquiries by conventional mail. Also,
because the filings are made so rarely, office staff have so little familiarity
with them that they typically deny the possibility of such a filing: it is of
course difficult to conduct a search for something in a public office that
denies that it is obligated to accept such filings. Finally, and most
importantly, many of the alternatives do not require public filings; there is
no public filing, for example, associated with a foreclosure under UCC
Article 9. The combination of those problems makes it impractical to rely
on public records.
Similarly, in some states there is no public filing for an ABC.1 5 Other
liquidation methods-a hibernation 6 or a voluntary surrender of assets to
creditors or investors-might not involve the kind of discrete event that
could be captured in a filing. That problem is complicated by the overlap
between methods---even methods like bankruptcy or a foreclosure that
involve discrete objective events. Thus, it is common for a secured
creditor to foreclose and conduct an auction of some assets, while the
17
firm's managers might auction personal property through DoveBid.
Another possibility is that the firm might sell different portions of the
assets to different companies by negotiated sales that occur at different
times. Finally, and most commonly, the firm might file for bankruptcy

15. California is the obvious example.
16. A hibernation is a process suitable for a firm with technology that is functional but thought to
be "ahead of its time." The hibernating firm lays off its employees and ceases operations, hoping that
the market will improve. For details, see Sherwood Partners, Business Continuity Advisors, at
http://shrwood.com/hibernation.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
17. For background on that alternative, see Dovebid, at http://www.dovebid.com (last visited
Jan. 30, 2005). In my data set, 2d Century, Broadband Office, Darwin Networks, and Napster used
Dovebid to conduct auctions while they were in bankruptcy.
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after engaging in one or more of the other possible options. That overlap
problem makes it particularly difficult to obtain reliable infornation from
interviews. For example, a lender might tell me which firms on the list are
firms to which she has advanced funds, 18 and how many of those firms
suffered foreclosure, but she might have no recollection of a bankruptcy or
other disposition that occurred months or years after a foreclosure in
which the lender was paid much of its outstanding indebtedness.
Collecting information directly from the failed firms would be even more
problematic because of the difficulty of locating knowledgeable executives
years after a firm has failed.
Another possibility would be to rely on the VentureSource data to
describe the particular type of liquidation event. That data has much to be
said for it: it is updated regularly (by quarterly interviews with
executives), relies on direct connections with knowledgeable firm insiders,
and includes good financial information about private firms. 19 Thus, I
think it is quite reliable with respect to the point discussed above-the
collection of a universe of firms that have failed. It is less useful, however,
with respect to information about the various alternatives. For example,
the descriptive information in the data set reports that most firms "ceased
operations, 2 ° which does not distinguish in a useful way among the
various options of interest to me. Similarly, there are a large number of
firms (107, about 15% of 742) for which the descriptive information is
missing entirely, either because VentureSource "lost contact" with the firm
or because the entry is simply blank.2 Similarly, the data grossly underreport bankruptcy filings, for which I have an objective third-party source
(discussed below): VentureSource shows only 11 bankruptcy filings, while
my searches found 161.22
One final possibility would have been to rely on media reports, which
are readily available on the Internet for many of the firms. Unfortunately,
it became clear that I would not be able to obtain complete coverage
through media reports. More troubling, it became equally clear to me that
press reports were not reliable; none, for example, reported an ABC

18. That information would be useful because the market for institutional lending to venturebacked firms is, as my interviews generally suggest, quite concentrated.
19. Dow Jones Venture One, Dow Jones Venture Source, at http://ventureone.com (last visited
Feb. 11,2005).
20. Id. VentureSource used that designation for 28 of the 31 biopharmaceutical firms for which it
reported an outcome, 148 of the 198 telecommunication firms for which it reported an outcome, and
252 of the 351 software firms for which it reported an outcome.
21. See Dow Jones Venture Source, supra note 19.
22. Id.
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(despite data I have collected indicating ABCs for a large number of
specifically identified firms in the data set) and few reported auctions or
foreclosures (despite anecdotal evidence from the interviews and Internet
sites suggesting that those events are common). I also considered the
possibility of supplementing media reports with targeted surveys sent to
firms not discussed in the media. The poor results of the VentureSource
surveys, however, convinced me that such an inquiry would not produce
reliable information. The basic problem, I think, is that responsible
business executives at these firms often do not have a concrete
understanding of the legal choices that their attorneys or creditors have
made, particularly when there is no bankruptcy filing.
In the end, then, I decided to limit my quantitative inquiries to two
relatively objective events: bankruptcy and ABC filings. On the first, I
used Internet searches of PACER and individual federal-court Websites to
collect basic information about any bankruptcy filings by the firms. 23 In
cases in which the schedules were not available on PACER, I obtained
photocopies of the schedules from the relevant courts. With respect to
ABC filings, I collected information for the four largest states in the data
set (California, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas). For California
(where there are no public filings), I relied on confidential interviews with
the four largest firms that facilitate ABCs. For the other three states, which
do require such filings, I conducted searches in the relevant public
offices. 24
To supplement that quantitative data, I conducted 23 interviews
(predominantly by telephone, although occasionally in person) with
individuals who have useful information about the choices I am
examining: ten lawyers who work in the area, 25 four lenders to hightechnology firms, 26 five executives at turnaround firms (who typically

23. Using the U.S. Party/Case index in PACER, I collected information on all bankruptcies filed
as of December 31, 2003. With respect to the courts that are not listed on that index (N.D. Ala., S.D.
Ga., Idaho, S.D. Ind., E.D.N.C., M.D. Tenn., Virgin Islands, and E.D. Wash), I searched in individual
court databases in the state in which the firm resides. Of course, that may have resulted in some underreporting of bankruptcies, either because of discrepancies between the names used in bankruptcy
filings and the names used in VentureOne (e.g., I did not search for any natural persons) or because of
the possibility that some non-local firms filed in the districts that are not included in the index. I
concluded that the latter possibility is insignificant, because most of the non-index districts have an
insubstantial number of business filings. I found no cases in any of the non-index districts other than
E.D.N.C.
24. As discussed above, the decentralized nature of those filings made that task complicated,
which is why I limited it to the three largest states in the data set outside of California.
25. This group includes five lawyers from California, three from Massachusetts, and two from
Texas.
26. All of the lenders were from institutions with a national presence. Three of the executives

1384

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL.

82:1375

handle not only turnarounds but also liquidations),2 7 three California
bankruptcy judges, and one venture capital investor with experience in the
area. As is typical for my work, the interviews were relatively open-ended.
Suitably redacted transcripts of the interviews will appear on my Website
when this paper is published.2 8
II.

ANALYZING THE DATA

A. Summary Data
The total data set includes 742 firms: 40 in the biopharmaceutical
("biopharm") sector, 29 244 in the communications sector, 30 and 458 in the
software sector.3 1
Figure 1: Breakdown of Dotoast by Industry

...

opharm
5%

were located in California, one in Texas.
27. One of the turnaround firms had a national presence. Of the five individuals, four were
located in California and one in Massachusetts.
28. The posted transcripts will not include material from the interviews with judges and two of
the attorneys, which were conducted on the basis that I would keep my notes of those conversations
confidential.
29. This sector is comprised primarily of firms engaged in the drug discovery and drug delivery
subsectors, with a few firms in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical subsectors.
30. In addition to internet, wireless and telecommunications service providers, this sector
includes firms that sell connectivity products, fiber optic equipment, and wireless communications
equipment.
31. This sector is probably the most diverse, with firms that develop business applications
software, communications and connectivity tools, database software, educational software, games,
graphics and publishing software, multimedia networking software, and many different types of
vertical market applications software.
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Out of the entire population, the total number of bankruptcy filings was
161, only 22% of all of the failed firms. 32 The bankruptcy rates by sector

ranged from 17% in the software sector to 28% in the biopharm sector and
29% in the communications sector. Out of the 161 bankruptcy filings,
there were 68 firms (42%) in Chapter 11 at some point in the process and
93 firms (58%) that were exclusively in Chapter 7.33 Although I do not
examine the question in detail in this paper, the regression models reported
below suggest, as the raw data imply, that bankruptcy filings in the
and
software sector are significantly lower than the filings in the biopharm
34
communications sectors, even controlling for firm location and size.
Figure 2. Bankruptcy Rates by Industry

35%

20%

10%

Comm

Biopharm

Software

The firms were located in thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia. Not surprisingly, however, most of the firms were concentrated
in a small number of states. Thus, the four most populated states included
almost two-thirds (65%) of the firms.

32. I say "only" because some readers might expect that the majority of failing firms would make
use of the bankruptcy system. That expectation is not, however, universal. In particular, recent
literature about venture-backed firms has suggested that those firms do not use bankruptcy at all,
relying on contracts to "opt out" of the state-provided bankruptcy system. Baird & Rasmussen,
ControlRights, supra note 2, at 956; Smith & Strrmberg, supra note 3. The data set I analyze here is
direct evidence that a significant group of venture-backed companies do use the bankruptcy system to
facilitate an effective liquidation of their assets.
33. Two of the 68 initially were filed in Chapter 7 and later converted to Chapter 11. For
purposes of this paper, I treat any firm that was ever in Chapter 11 as being a "Chapter 11 case."
Unlike the biopharmaceutical and software sectors where Chapter 7 cases predominated (8 out of 11 in
biopharmaceutical and 60 out of 80 in software), Chapter 11 cases were predominant in the
communications sector (45 out of 70).
34. Understanding the role that a firm's industry plays in the decision to file for bankruptcy is an
important part of the analysis that I have yet to explore fully. However, I do offer some tentative
hypotheses related to the role of a firm's industry that relate to my explanation in Part III of the issues
that motivate firms to use bankruptcy in liquidation.
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Figure 3- Breakdown of Oatouset by Location

The final data points that I collected from VentureSource are two
different proxies for the size of the firm: number of employees and total
amount raised. Both proxies indicated that the communications firms were
larger than firms in the other sectors. The median number of employees
ranged from 18 (biopharm) to 30 (software) to 55 (communications). The
median amount raised ranged from $9 million (software) to $9.5 million
(biopharm) to $28 million (communications). Table 1 provides summary
data about the size of the firms.
Table 1: CapitalizationofDatasetby Industry
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The share of firms that obtained patents differed sharply by sector,
from 63% (25/40) in biopharm to 26% (64/244) in communications to
14% (63/458) in software. 35 The number of patents per firm differed
similarly. Overall, those numbers ranged from 3.9 patents per biopharm
firm, to 1.4 patents per communications firm, to 0.5 patents per software
firm. Among firms with patents, the respective rates were 6.2 patents per
patenting biopharm firm, 5.4 patents per patenting communications firm,
and 3.5 patents per patenting software firm.
Figure 4. Share of PotentinS Firms by Industry

70%
60%
50%
40%

30%
20%
10%;
OC
Biopharm

Comm

Software

B. Intellectual Propertyand Bankruptcy
The first hypothesis I investigated was that firms with patents would be
less likely to file for bankruptcy because of the inadequacies of the
bankruptcy process as a device for maximizing the value of sophisticated
intellectual property. For example, one attorney explained:
[T]he more sophisticated the assets and the more intellectual
property involved, the more important it is to have the person who
has a sophistication about them trying to dispose of that. And, again
that would be an ABC where you get to hand pick [the trustee, so
that you can use a sophisticated liquidator] as opposed to a
bankruptcy trustee.36

35.

This sectoral difference resembles the data I report from a slightly different data set in Mann,

supra note 6.

36. Telephone Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003); see also Telephone
Interview with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004).

1388

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL.

82:1375

As it happens, however, the data do not support that hypothesis. By each
of the measures that I tested, the relation between a patent portfolio and
the likelihood that the failed firm will choose to file for bankruptcy is
essentially random.
On reflection, bolstered by discussion in a number of interviews, this
makes sense. Many of the interview subjects insisted that firms with
strong IP assets would be deterred from filing for bankruptcy, but on
questioning it became clear that what they meant by strong IP assets was
any type of asset that was "high-tech," whether or not a patent protected
it. 37 The loose relation between patents and valuable technologies
aggravates that problem: not all valuable technology is patented and not all
patented technology is valuable.38 Thus, because the population is by
definition a set of firms with predominantly high-technology assets, the
existence of patents does not directly address the relevant question. In the
end, those interviews suggest that I would find a significant effect,
inversely related to bankruptcy filings, between high-technology industries
and other industries. At this time, however, I do not have data with which
to investigate that question.3 9

37. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003); Telephone Interview
with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround
Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003).
38. For example, sophisticated companies will protect many valuable innovations as trade
secrets, without patents. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Propertyand the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
3, 9-10 (2004); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 683, 709 (1980). Conversely, the great majority of patents plainly have little commercial
value. See, e.g., Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristicsof Patent Litigation: A
Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495 (2001); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents (2003)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstractjid=426020)
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
39. At least in recent years, most venture capital investments have been made in high-tech
industries. Thus, the various databases of venture capital investments are not useful for constructing a
data set of failed firms in industries with hard-core tangible assets. Moreover, I am not aware of any
other data set of failed firms. Although secretaries of state have records on firms whose charters have
been suspended, revoked, or forfeited, my experience suggests that information about firm charters
does not say much about what actually happened to the firm or the time at which a firm actually ceases
to exist. Among other things, firms often will fail to dissolve formally at the time they cease to do
business, often because of the fee the state requires for formal dissolution. Interview with Second
Texas Attorney (Sept. 23, 2004). In some states, there also might be data about charters revoked for
failure to pay franchise taxes. Those data, however, are likely to differ substantially from state to state
based on differences in local tax systems. Id. Thus, they provide little basis for a national study such as
this. There is also some census data and data collected by the Small Business Administration about
firm failures, but those data do not include any specific information about particular firms.
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C. Location and Bankruptcy
1. The Basic Hypothesis: Location and Bankruptcy
a. Formulatingthe Basic Hypothesis
The most productive hypothesis that I investigated was one that was
not apparent to me when I began this project, but quickly emerged in
interviews. This is the notion that bankruptcies of high-technology firms
should be relatively less common in California because of the common use
in that state of the ABC procedure. 40 The process is governed for the most
part by provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 41 Among
other things, those provisions require the assignee to provide written
notice to all creditors and equity holders within 30 days of the
assignment. 42 The notice must include a "bar date," between 150 and 180
days after the date of the notice, by which creditors must file claims
against the estate.43 The statute also permits the assignee to recover
preferences in a provision modeled on Bankruptcy Code § 547.44 Finally,

40. The best general introduction to an ABC is an American Bankruptcy Institute publication
written by a California professional in the industry: GEOFFREY L. BERMAN, GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS
FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2000). See also Geoffrey L. Berman,

Common Law Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors: The Reemergence of the Non-Bankruptcy
Alternative, 21 CAL. BANKR. J. 357 (1993) (describing specifically the California ABC); Mike C.
Buckley & Gregory Sterling, What Banks Need to Know About ABCs, 120 BANKING L.J. 48 (2003);
David S. Kupetz, Note, Assignmentfor the Benefit of Creditors:Exit Vehicle of Choicefor Many DotCom, Technology, and Other Troubled Enterprises, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 71 (2001).
41. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1800-1802 (West Supp. 2005).
42. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1802(a) (West Supp. 2005). The assignor is obligated to provide the
assignee a complete list, with addresses, of the parties entitled to notice. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE

§ 1802(c) (West Supp. 2005). That of course leaves open the possibility that the assignor either
intentionally or inadvertently will omit some creditors from the list. The statute does not address the
significance of omission from the list, but presumably omission from the list and consequent lack of
notice would raise the possibility that the proceeding did not bind the creditor in question. E.g., Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929) (analyzing that aspect of a similar Arkansas law). My
interview subjects report that assignees are careful to notify tax creditors, fearing that they would be
personally liable for tax claims that would have been entitled to payment if they had received notice
and presented a claim. See 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2000) (providing for such a priority for federal tax
claims); Kupetz, supra note 40, at 80; Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Sept. 23,
2004) (discussing likelihood that an assignee would face a similar liability to unnotified state tax
creditors).
43. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1802(b) (West Supp. 2005).
44. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1800 (West Supp. 2005). That statute is not unique. As David Skeel
notes, almost half (22 at the time that he wrote) of the states have provisions for the avoidance of
preferences. David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 556 (1994). The statutes appear to be historical relics of the time
before Congress adopted a permanent federal bankruptcy law, when only the states were attending to
the problems of insolvency.
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it includes some statutory priorities modeled on Bankruptcy Code
§ 502(b).45
The interviews with lawyers and turnaround professionals in California
reflect a consistent understanding that an ABC often is superior to
bankruptcy as a mechanism for liquidating a failed high-tech company.
The basic point is that an experienced assignee is superior to a Chapter 7
trustee because of three advantages the assignee has over the trustee in
Chapter 7: the assignee can act more quickly; the assignee is likely to be
assets; and the use of
more experienced at dealing with technology-related
46
costs.
transaction
lower
an assignee involves
On the first point, the assignee often can dispose of the assets within
just a few days of the assignment, if the assignee is satisfied that it already
has located the best buyer for the assets.4 7 Surprisingly, the interviews
suggested that the optimal buyer often is so obvious that the assignor
identifies the ultimate buyer in the earliest conversations with the potential
assignee. 48 A trustee in bankruptcy, in contrast, rarely would be able to sell
an entire business so quickly after a bankruptcy filing.4 9
The second point is related to the first. In California, at least, the
assignee is likely to be one of a handful of companies that specialize in
serving as an assignee in these circumstances. Because these companies
exist largely to extract value from the assets of failed companies, it is
plausible that their experience-if only the "bigger rolodex" of contacts
from past transactionS 5 --would produce greater returns than a trustee. 5'

45. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1204-1204.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005).
46. Nobody would suggest that an ABC is always superior. There are a variety of transactionspecific financial reasons why bankruptcy might be preferable, such as cases in which bankruptcy
priorities would be lower than the priorities under the state statute and cases in which bankruptcy tax
benefits are important. See Interview with Fifth California Attorney (Jan. 7, 2005).
47. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone
Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003).
48. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone
Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004).
49. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003).
50. See Telephone Interview with Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004).
51. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003) (explaining that "the
trustees that you get in a Chapter 7 case aren't very good at selling intellectual property" and that an
ABC gives a firm access to "someone who will actually do a better job selling the intellectual property
than the trustee would"); Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003)
(explaining that ABCs can produce the "highest and best price" for the assets of a failed firm);
Telephone Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003) ("[T]he assignee in an ABC is just
more likely to be more sophisticated than a bankruptcy trustee-will do a better job maximizing the
value of the assets and will do it in a quick way so that creditors of the company will generally come
out ahead."); Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003) ("[B]ankruptcy
trustees typically are not good at or willing to invest the effort to sell intellectual property. ....
Bankruptcy trustees are usually lawyers, they're not IP experts, they don't have a staff of people who
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That is true not simply because of a variation in expertise, but also because
of the undoubtedly excessive workload that faces the typical bankruptcy
trustee. 52 The fact that experienced creditors commonly consent to the
process suggests that the returns are higher than returns in a bankruptcy.5 3
A related point is the ready ability of the assignee to use the services of
employees with knowledge of the technology that is useful in maximizing
the sales price.54 Although it is not impossible for a business in Chapter 7
to continue paying employees, it is not easy:

go in and deal with the nuance of something like an intellectual property asset. Patents, trademarks,
copyrights, software, operating systems, biotechnology assets, communications assets, they're just not
experts in it."); Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003) ("[O]ne of the
really great benefits that I think is perceived frequently by the directors and officers of these tech
companies, is here they can go out and they can select who the assignee is, they can meet with the
assignee upfront, and can be comfortable that the assignee really does have the expertise and
experience to try to maximize value. . .. They don't have to encounter an unknown trustee like they
would if they were to file a Chapter 7."); Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround Professional
(Dec. 17 & 19, 2003) (suggesting that an assignment is preferable "if the goal is to maximize value
and put the assets back in the economic stream, quickly and efficiently"); Telephone Interview with
Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004) ("1 do think that nine times out of ten, you're better off having
a Sherwood Partners or a Diablo Management or some other turnaround assignee looking to liquidate
the assets than handing it over to a Chapter 7 trustee."); Telephone Interview with Venture Investor
(Apr. 16, 2004) ("[W]hen you have the ABC option, you get 98% of the benefits of bankruptcy for
about one-tenth the cost.").
52. See Telephone Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003). The creditors do
have the right under Bankruptcy Code § 702 to appoint their own trustee even in a Chapter 7
bankruptcy. But because such an appointment probably would not occur for about a month after the
bankruptcy it would be a poor substitute for an ABC procedure that can complete a transfer in a matter
of days.
53. Although my interviews do not suggest it, another possibility suggested by a reader of an
early draft is that insiders prefer the ABC process because they have greater control over the ABC
professional than they would have over a trustee. The interviews with lenders suggest, however, that
lenders actually worry about an ABC process because they have less control than they would have in
the more formal bankruptcy process. Thus, lenders tend to view the lack of control in an ABC as a
counterbalance to a perceived greater monetary recovery. As one California Lender stated:
I think from a creditor's perspective the one negative is that you don't necessarily have all of
the checks and balances that a bankruptcy court trustee might add to the process. And so,
there's an accounting. They kind of get comfortable with the folks who are doing it because
you know there have been some decent outcomes, but in the back of my mind I'm always
thinking, the one dropback [sic] here is there's probably not as much control, or creditors
don't feel as if there's as much control in the process.
Telephone Interview with Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004); see also Interview with Second
California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004) (similar perspective).
54. See First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second California
Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004);
Telephone Interview with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004) ("One thing that we've found is, you
get more value out of that technology or the intellectual property if you can keep the people around it
who can actually explain it, make it work, and help whoever wants to purchase it or use it, help them
make it successful.").
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[W]hen was the last time you saw a Chapter 7 trustee want to
operate a company? He can get special authority to do so. It takes
an order of the court to do so. To do it you need cash collateral steps
...You need notice and all that other stuff to do it. So the Chapter 7
trustee almost never runs a company pending a sale. 5
By contrast, it is relatively simple for an assignee to complete a sale
without first having to close the business. In a typical arrangement, the
assignor might approach the assignee with a potential purchaser. The
assignee would conduct due diligence about the sale before taking an
assignment. If the assignee concluded that the sale was appropriate, it then
would take an assignment and complete the sale almost simultaneously,
sending notice to creditors promptly after the assignment and sale.5 6
Several months later, after receiving and examining all of the relevant
claims, funds would be distributed.57 As one attorney who described that
process to me remarked, "[N]o bankruptcy trustee can do that. 58
Finally, and perhaps least important, the net cost of the process seems
to be less than a bankruptcy proceeding. 59 This is thought to be true, even
though the assignee charges a fee that seems to be much higher than the
typical fee a trustee would charge, 60 because liquidation through an ABC

55. Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003).
56. See id.; Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004).
57. Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004). Indeed, secured
creditors and priority creditors often would be paid earlier, whenever funds were available for such
claims. Id.
58. Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); see also Telephone
Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003) (describing a similar scenario).
59. There is of course a substantial amount of literature, much of it empirical, documenting the
transaction costs of business bankruptcies. See, e.g., Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless,
ProfessionalFees and Other Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1207 (1997);
Stephen P. Ferris et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small-Firm
Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 847; Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs
and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990); Karen Hopper Wruck, Financial
Distress, Reorganization,and OrganizationalEfficiency, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 419, 436-39 (1990). Most,
if not all, of that literature is beside the relevant point here-that a bankruptcy imposes a substantial
amount of fixed costs which do not vary with the size of the firm and which can be avoided through
the use of alternative liquidation procedures. To the relevant decisionmakers, those costs present a
floor: if the alternate procedure costs less than those fixed costs, it will save money. The point here is
simply that experienced executives in California believe that ABCs often cost less than the minimum
costs of a formal bankruptcy proceeding.
60. The typical trustee's fee would be 3%. Several subjects suggested a typical minimum fee for
a sophisticated assignee of $75,000-100,000, see Telephone Interview with Third California
Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19,
2003), with the general percentage fee being about 7.5% of the proceeds. See Telephone Interview
with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003); see also Katherine Goncharoff, Fade
Away (July 17, 2002), at http://www.shrwood.com/media td-0207.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004)
(same).
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avoids the transaction costs associated with a typical Chapter 7
bankruptcy--costs of formal notices to creditors, attorney's fees
associated with the bankruptcy process, and the like. One California
attorney explained the point at length:
From the debtor's side you have to file bankruptcy schedules and do
the formality of that, you have to attend at least a single hearing.
And, so you've paid a lawyer, and you've done that stuff and that's
gone on. And the bankruptcy trustee comes in. If the trustee thinks
it's complicated enough, the trustee has a lawyer and sometimes an
accountant. And so those are all going to be costs of administration.
And then there is just going to be the time. And the time elongates
in bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, months just go on and on and on, so
they get to be expensive. So what is it going to cost? A little
company may file bankruptcy for $6,500 or $10,000-you know
that is not a huge fee when it comes time to liquidate something.
But in terms of the delays and everything else, you may be talking
about doubling or tripling that in terms of the administrative costs as
you go through the system of the bankruptcy trustee and his counsel
and the like.
If you do an assignment all you do is you do a board of directors'
resolution. You make the assignment, which is typically a
preprinted form. You give a list of creditors. The assignor has now
completed his work. The assignee takes the assets and while it too
has a choice of engaging counsel or what have you, if it's just going
to be an asset liquidation, often times there are no professionals
hired at all. It's just the assignee takes it, does due diligence to see if
the sale is good, and makes a sale. 6'
When the topic initially was mentioned in interviews, I was skeptical. I
had assumed that one of the most difficult aspects of a workable process
for a non-bankruptcy transfer of assets would be to ensure that the assets
were transferred free of existing or potential liabilities. In California at
least, professionals seem to think that is not a serious problem.62 Part of
the reason is the nature of the firms that I am studying, venture-backed

61. Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); see also Telephone
Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004) (similar discussion).
62. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003) (describing the
ability to provide title free and clear of claims as "one of the ... fundamental principles that an ABC is
all about"); Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003) (ability to sell free
and clear is the "whole concept" of an ABC).
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firms that have not yet gone public. 63 Interview subjects assumed that the
main risk would be after-the-fact suits for breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with the assignment. They argued, however, that such suits are
relatively unlikely in that context because the major outside equity
investors are venture capitalists, who are unlikely to get involved in that
kind of litigation. 64 Because the firms often have not yet started selling
products and are unlikely to have complicated debt structures, the
likelihood of later,disputes is smaller than it is for companies that are more
mature or have more intricate debt structures. 65 Yet, neither the statutes
nor the cases in California specifically validate the title of a purchaser
from the assignee.66 Rather, it is more likely that the willingness to take
that risk is driven by the economic motivation of the higher returns that an
ABC can bring:
Sometimes, if everything else is equal, a buyer, generally speaking,
would prefer to have a bankruptcy court order blessing the
acquisition. But frequently, because the assignment process can
work so smoothly and efficiently, the benefits of doing an

63. That is an artifact of my data set of course, but more broadly ABCs are rare for public
companies because of the shareholder approvals that typically are required for an ABC but not for a
bankruptcy filing. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003). For a
more general discussion of the policy implications of the public company dynamic, see infra note 159.
64. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Re-interview) (Mar. 30, 2004). It
also is relevant that the venture capitalists may fear suit by the owners for their own responsibility for
the shutdown, which might make them reluctant to institute litigation challenging the liquidation
decisions of the entrepreneurs. See Maria Guzzo, InfoSAGE Sues Mellon Ventures: Software Firm
Claims Fund Foiled Financing Plan, PiT. Bus. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, available at http://www.biz
joumals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2002/02/11 /story2.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). The problem is
that the relations between venture capitalists and those in whom they invest necessarily give the
venture capitalists control over the decision to terminate the firm's operations. See e.g., GOMPERS &
LERNER, supra note 8, ch. 12; William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 506-14 (1990); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strdmberg, Financial
Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Venture CapitalContracts (2000)
(NBER Working Paper No. 7660, available at http://gsbwww.uchicago.eduI/fac/finance/papers/
kaplanstrom.pdf) (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). For a complementary perspective, one California lender
emphasized that the reason that it is difficult to use ABCs for public firms is because the
representatives of the public debt holders are much more likely to resort to litigation than the firms that
are likely to have extended credit to privately held venture-backed firms. See Telephone Interview
with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004).
65. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). Similarly, those
firms may be less likely than more mature firms to have serious concerns about other common types of
unliquidated and unmatured liabilities---environmental claims, personal injury claims, IP infringement
claims, or securities fraud. The simple fact is that the outstanding liabilities of firms that have not yet
started selling products are more predictable than the outstanding liabilities of firms that have broader
operations.
66. The laws in the other jurisdictions that I examined (New York, Massachusetts, and Texas)
are no more clear on this point than those in California.
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assignment outweigh the fact that you're not gonna have any court
order as the buyer.6 7
b. Testing the Basic Hypothesis
The interviews with California professionals support the basic
hypothesis that failed high-tech companies in California should choose
bankruptcy less frequently than failed high-tech companies in other
locations. Unfortunately, it is not easy to test that hypothesis directly.
Because California law does not require any public filing, I could not
collect information on which California firms used ABCs. Accordingly, I
tested the corollary hypothesis that bankruptcy rates are lower in
California. The data provide considerable support for that hypothesis.
Looking at the raw data, for example, the bankruptcy rate overall was
about 17%, but it was only 14% in California. Because the data strongly
suggested that bankruptcy rates varied by size of firm and by industry, I
decided to analyze the data more carefully by using a logistic 68 regression

with a dependent variable of whether the firm filed for any kind of
bankruptcy. I included independent variables for the existence of patents
("PAT"), the industry of the firm ("BIOPHARM," "COMM," "SFTWR"),
the size by employees ("SMLEMP," "MEDEMP," "LRGEMP"), the size
by amount raised ("SMLAM," "MEDAM," "LARGAM"), and whether
the firm was located in California ("CA"). As the table below shows,6 9
location in California was significant at the 1% level. The negative
coefficient, like the low odds ratio,70 indicates an inverse correlation with
bankruptcy filings. A goodness-of-fit test indicates that addition of the CA
location variable significantly improves the model compared to a model
without a location variable.

67.
68.

Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16. 2003).
1 used a logistic regression instead of an OLS regression because the dependent variable

(bankruptcy filing) is binary.
69. In the data analysis, the reference category for industry is software, so I report coefficients
and odds ratios for the differences in the biopharmaceutical and telecommunication sectors from

software firms. Similarly, the reference categories for amount raised and employees were the
categories for the larger firms. Thus, the tables report coefficients and odds ratios for the differences

between small and medium firms and large firms.
70. An odds ratio below 1.0 indicates that the dependent variable is found less frequently in the

category in question than in the reference category; an odds ratio above 1.0 indicates that the
dependent variable occurs more frequently in the category in question than in the reference category.
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Table 2: California and Bankruptcy Rates
Coeff

Odds Ratio

Constant

-0.352
(0.228)

0.703

PAT

0.061
(0.248)

1.063

BIOPIIARM

0.93 1*
(0.436)

2.537

0.400
(0.222)

1.492

SMLEMP

-1.392***
(0.337)

0.249

MEDEMP

-0.799**
(0.254)

0.450

-0.486

0.615

COMM

SMLAM

(0.35)_______

MEDAM

CA

* p<.05

** p<.01

-0.154
(0.251)

0.857

-0.805***
(0.217)

0.447

*** p<.001

N=635

To bolster the argument that the prevalence of ABCs is an important
reason for suppressed bankruptcy filings in California, it would have been
useful to collect information about the number of ABC filings. As
discussed above, I was not able to do that in a systematic way. I was able,
however, to collect from the four turnaround firms that I interviewed the
number (but not the identities) of the California firms in the data set,
organized by industry, for which each of those firms had served as
assignees in an ABC. 71 Figure 5 shows how those numbers-which reflect
30 ABCs (about 10% of all failed California firms)--relate to the expected

71. Given the high concentration of expertise my interviews suggested, I think it is likely that my
inquiries identified the overwhelming majority of California ABCs in my data set.
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and actual number of bankruptcy filings in California. Generally, it
suggests that the number of ABCs is a substantial fraction of the total
bankruptcy filings. My efforts to locate similar filings in Massachusetts,
New York, and Texas (the next three largest states in the data set) indicate
that one firm in Massachusetts (out of about seventy five) and that none of
the approximately 100 firms in New York and Texas used the ABC
procedure.
Fiure 5; ABC and Bankruptcy filings In Ca(forna
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2. Refining the Hypothesis
a. Trying to Separate Law and Culture
That finding led me to seek more information about exactly why and
how a preference for ABCs operates in California. Some, but not all, of

the interviews suggested that the preference for ABCs was a cultural norm
fostered in northern California. For example, one Palo Alto attorney
explained that "it has a lot to do with whether you are in the Valley or not.
Because the farther you get away from the sort of technology centers, the
more likely it is that a company will go into bankruptcy. 72 In its most

aggressive form, the preference reflected the view that people in northern
California understand that the sophisticated and effective way to liquidate
failing high-tech firms is to use an ABC. Other locales use different
methods because the lawyers and lenders in those areas are less
sophisticated. The premise is that professionals in California have simply
had more experience in doing liquidations of high-tech firms because of
the concentration of failed high-tech firms there in recent years.73 As

72. Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003).
73. See Telephone Interview with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004) ("It may be just that it
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Figure 3 illustrates, for example, more than 40% of my data set is from
California, almost twice as much as the next three largest States combined.
It should be no surprise that the experience would have taught them
something professionals in other areas have not yet learned. The most
telling evidence in support of that claim is the general view that even in
California-where the formal legal system has not changed in any
apparently relevant way in recent years-ABCs are much more common
than they used to be. 74 As one attorney put it: "[I]f you go back ten years
here in California there weren't nearly as many ABCs as there are now.
I think people just started noticing that that was another way to do
things. 75 That discussion would suggest that I would obtain a better fit
with a geographic variable that included only northern California, using a
location variable that is smaller than the CA variable to reflect the 12% of
the population based in southern California.76
Other interviews suggested that the effect rested on important
differences in the legal rules that govern ABCs in California. Those
interview subjects started by pointing out that the ABC process in
California historically originated in southern California, in the Los
Angeles metropolitan area, and became common in Silicon Valley only in
recent years.77 More affirmatively, the professionals emphasized that
ABCs in California can be accomplished under a common-law process
that does not involve any judicial filing of any kind at all. 78 This allows the
process to move rapidly and at relatively low cost. Other states, by
contrast, often require judicial filings and other onerous conditions that
make the process less practical. 79 This explanation would suggest that I
would get the best fit with the model discussed above, using a geographic
variable that distinguished between California and the rest of the
population.

may be a practice that is historically due to the size of the economy out here, that people historically
didn't realize it's an option and it's a less expensive option. That may be part of it. It just may be that
it's more popular out here than elsewhere because you just have more companies.").
74. See Telephone Interview with Fourth Turnaround Professional (June 18, 2004).
75. Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003).
76. That hypothesis resonates, of course, with the research of Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook on
the effect of local legal culture on the consumer choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy
filings. See Sullivan et al., The Persistenceof Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidencefrom the
FederalBankruptcy Courts, 17 HARv. J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 801 (1994).

77. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003).
78. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003).
79. See id.
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Complicating matters still further, several interview subjects8"
suggested that bankruptcy filings for high-tech firms are particularly
difficult in the Ninth Circuit because of the decision in In re Catapult
Entertainment, Inc.8 That case generally held that the debtor-inpossession in a bankruptcy proceeding cannot assume a nonexclusive
patent license held by the debtor before bankruptcy, even if the debtor has
no plans to assign the license to a third party.82 Given the likelihood that
the businesses of high-tech startups will depend in part on nonexclusive
licenses of intellectual property, Catapult is a major hindrance to the
operation of a high-tech business in bankruptcy in the Ninth Circuit. If the
federal legal system caused the distinction, I should find a better fit with a
model that stopped at the boundaries of the Ninth Circuit, picking up, in
addition to California, the 836% of the firms in Oregon, Washington,
Hawaii, Idaho, and Arizona.
I investigated those explanations in two different ways. First, I ran
models that altered the boundary of the portion of the data set in which
bankruptcies are depressed. Thus, I used a model that replaced the
California variable described above with a variable that differentiated
between northern California and the rest of the data set ("NO CAL"). As
the table below suggests, the results generally were similar to the results in
Table 2 (which used the CA variable). The influence of the NO CAL
variable is slightly less than the influence of the California variable: the
odds ratio is closer to 1 (.467 for NO CAL versus .447 for CA) and the
degree of significance is less (.002 for NO CAL versus .000 for CA). A
goodness-of-fit test indicated that the NO CAL variable made a significant

80. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone

Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second
Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003).
81. In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999).
82. Id. at 749-55 (rejecting a contrary decision of the First Circuit). Catapult is similar to rules
adopted by the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits. See In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257, 262 (4th
Cir. 2004); see also Marjorie Chertok & Warren E. Agin, Restart.com, Identifying, Securing and
Maximizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L.

REV. 255, 288-93 (2000). Interview subjects believe that the rule in Catapult (and cases like it) makes
bankruptcy systematically unattractive to software finns. Telephone Interview with Second California
Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003).
83. Because the Catapult rule is the law in other jurisdictions, this line is not perfect. Thus, even
if Catapult were one of the dominating factors, my regressions might not show a substantial effect
based on the Ninth Circuit boundary. It does appear, however, that the Catapult rule is not the law in
the other major jurisdictions in my data set, including the First Circuit (which has a contrary rule), and
the Second and Fifth Circuits (which seem not to have addressed the question). See supra note 82
(discussing decisions of other circuits).
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improvement over a model without a location variable, but the fit was not
as good as with the CA variable.
Table 3: Northern California and Bankruptcy Rates

Constant

Coeff

Odds Ratio

-0.417

0.659

(0.225)

PAT

0.006
(0.248)

1.006

BIOPHARM

0.935*
(0.433)

2.547

COMM

0.377
(0.222)

1.458

-1.40***

0.246

SMLEMP

(0.336)

MEDEMP

-0.81***
(0.253D

0.444

SMLAM

-0.482
(0.353)

0.618

MEDAM

-0.172

0.842

(0.250)

-0.76**
(0.240)

NOCAL
....... ........................

* p<.05

...

................ ............ ............................

** p<.01

*** p<.001

0.467
.............. ,.......

N=635

Still, the differences are slight and might be caused by the slightly
smaller number of NO CAL cases than CA cases. Moreover, even if the
statistical findings were robust, those findings standing alone would not
justify rejection of the cultural hypothesis, because there is some support
in the interviews for the notion that the relevant culture is one that fills the
entire state of California, having started in southern California and
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migrated recently to northern California. 84 Accordingly, I investigated the
matter further.
Parallel to the model in Table 3, I ran a model that used a geographic
variable of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ("CA9") to investigate the
possibility that federal law rather than state law was driving the
differential filing rates. Again, the location variable in that model was
highly significant, but not as influential as either the NO CAL or CA
variables. Similarly, a goodness-of-fit test indicated that the CA9 variable
made a significant improvement over a model without a location variable,
but the fit was not as good as with the CA or NO CAL variables.
Table 4: CA 9 and Bankruptcy Rates
Coeff

Odds Ratio

Constant

-0.395
(0.230)

0.674

PAT

0.042
(0.247)

1.042

BIOPHARM

0.896*
(0.433)

2.449

0.378

1.459

COMM

(0.221)

SMLEMP

-1.34***
(0.335)

0.261

MEDEMP

-0.77***

0.463

(0.253)
SMLAM

-0.495

0.610

(0.354)
MEDAM

-0.162

0.850

(0.249)
CA9

-0.580**

0.560

(0.206)
*

p<.05

** p<.01

*** p<.001

N=635

84. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003).
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To investigate the relative importance of law and culture further, I ran
separate models that used the three largest states in the population after
California: Massachusetts, New York, and Texas. The idea was that by
examining legal systems for ABCs outside California, I might be able to
determine whether the relative hostility of the legal system to ABCs
related to the rate of bankruptcy filings. Accordingly, as a first step in that
analysis, I examined the legal systems in those three states. In general, the
New York and Texas systems seem most hostile to ABCs, while the
Massachusetts statute seems to fall in between the most receptive system
in California and the least receptive systems in New York and Texas.
The basic criterion for evaluating the non-California statutes was the
extent of judicial involvement. As discussed above, the basic argument
presented in the interviews was that states that require a judicial process
lose the benefits of an ABC both because of the delays in obtaining
approvals and because of the costs of complying with the process. 85 That
argument ties directly to the point above about the importance of avoiding
the costs of the Chapter 7 process. Discussing the states that use a judicial
process, an attorney who represents the largest assignee in California
explained, "[ABCs are] just not used because there's no real benefit
compared to just filing bankruptcy. 86
Using that perspective, the Massachusetts statute seems to be the most
moderate of the three non-California statutes. It does not require any form
of judicial approval. The most onerous requirement seems to be that the
assignee obtain written consent to the assignment from a majority of the
creditors "in number and value." 87 In contrast to discussions of New York
and Texas in the interviews, the most serious complaints about the
Massachusetts system were that its law is not as clearly developed as
California's. 88 So, for example, a common complaint in interviews with
Massachusetts professionals was that turnaround professionals there, in the
absence of statutory support for their actions, feel compelled to give notice
to creditors and wait as long as a local bankruptcy court typically would
wait (several weeks) before completing a sale of the assets of a failed
firm. 89 In contrast, knowledgeable attorneys expect that a bankruptcy sale
in Massachusetts in fact could be accomplished more expeditiously

85. See Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone
Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004).
86. Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003).
87. MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 203 § 41 (Law. Co-op. 1981).
88. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003).
89. Massachusetts Professional Interview (transcript on file with author).
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because of the possibility of an order from the judge expediting the
standard notice period. 90
The most serious problem Massachusetts professionals identify,
however, is a general lack of confidence in the system, based on past
experiences in which assignees have cooperated with the executives of
failed firms to engage in collusive transactions that disadvantaged
creditors. 9' Thus, although several of my interview subjects stated that
assignments are used on occasion in Massachusetts, and perhaps even with
increasing frequency, 92 they do seem to be viewed with great hostility by
creditors, particularly secured creditors.9 3 As a result, they do not appear to
be effective in the high-tech transactions for which they are used in
California, in which all parties can agree that an immediate transfer to a
third party is the best course of action for keeping the technology together
with the employees necessary to operate it. 94 On that point, it is easy to
speculate that the highly localized venture-capital community in Silicon
Valley more easily might develop reputation-based norms of cooperation
than the more dispersed venture-capital community in Massachusetts (to
say nothing of the highly dispersed venture-capital community in Texas).
The next most onerous legal system appears to be the system in Texas.
Although the Texas statute does not require judicial supervision of the
entire process, it does require the assignee to file a final report with the
court, and the court must approve the report and make the final
distribution.9 5 A California attorney familiar with the Texas experience
doubted that professionals in Texas often would take advantage of that
process.9 6 My direct examination of filing records in Texas found no
filings for the approximately 50 Texas firms in the data set; similarly, the
results from interviews consistently indicate that ABCs are quite rare.
Attorneys, for example, may have heard of them as something that
happens occasionally, but direct experience is quite uncommon. 97 A major
technology lender to whom I spoke98 had never seen an ABC in his

90. Id.
91. The basic transaction seems to have been one in which the firm would make an assignment to
an unduly cooperative assignee, which immediately would sell the assets to a firm controlled by an
executive of the failed firm, making it difficult for creditors to locate the assets of the failed firm.
92. Massachusetts Professional Interview (transcript on file with author).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 23.23 (Vernon 2002).
96. See Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003).
97. See Telephone Interview with Texas Attorney (Oct. 13, 2003).
98. He was a lender in two of the eight Western District of Texas bankruptcies in the data set.
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lending portfolio in Texas. 99 The perspective of one experienced attorney
in Texas °° is that it would be easier to have the failing company file under
Chapter 7 and have the business purchased from a trustee than it would be
to do this through an assignee.10 1 Furthermore, the same attorney indicated
that she thought that a bankruptcy would provide much better closure for
outgoing officers than an ABC.102 As discussed above, California
turnaround professionals strongly disagree with that assessment.
She did echo, however, the typical California perspective in one regard
by emphasizing how poorly bankruptcy works for a failing high-tech
company. First, she emphasized that Chapter 7 was a poor fit for a
company with valuable technology assets because that technology needs to
be "kept with the engineers who developed it" and "packaged with the
specialized research equipment." 0 3 Because everybody would be laid off
immediately in a Chapter 7, she suggested that an auction works better in
that situation.10 4 Similarly, her view was that a Chapter 11 generally would
not be a useful option unless the company had sufficient resources to
survive for about six months, 05 which seems unlikely for most of the
smaller high-tech companies likely to go through ABCs in California.
Those interviews standing alone, of course, cannot separate the effect
of the legal system from the cultural hypothesis discussed above. For
example, the skepticism about the utility of ABCs may rest, at least in
part, on a lack of familiarity. This may pass as Texas lawyers gain
experience in dealing with distressed high-technology firms. One
interesting anecdote did provide considerable support for the view that the
reluctance to use ABCs in Texas, at least, is not entirely cultural. One of
the California attorneys that I interviewed was a member of a firm that has
an office in Austin. He described a recent transaction in which the firm
and the assignee expended considerable effort attempting to use Delaware
law to govern an assignment of a firm in Texas. These were parties
familiar with the process and highly motivated to use it, but quite
dissatisfied with the process available under Texas law. Ultimately, the
parties decided to use an assignment under Texas law, but the cost and

99. See Interview with Texas Lender (Oct. 29, 2003).
100. That attorney represented the debtor in two of the four Western District of Texas Chapter I Is
in my data set.
101. See Telephone Interview with Texas Attorney (Oct. 13, 2003).
102. See id.; Interview with Texas Lender (Oct. 29, 2003).
103. Telephone Interview with Texas Attorney (Oct. 13, 2003).
104. Id.

105. See id. As Figure 7 suggests, the six month figure seems optimistic for the firms in our data
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delay was much more than
they had been accustomed to based on their
06
experience in California.'
Turning finally to the New York statute, it seems plain that this is the
most onerous of the statutes that I examined. 10 7 Under the New York
statute, for example, a court generally administers the estate of the
assignor, determining such things as which claims are permissible,
whether the business can be operated while in the control of the assignee,
and whether actions should be brought to recover preferences. 0 8 Most
importantly, the assignee cannot sell assets at a private sale without
advance judicial authorization.10 9 Generally, 0courts view the process as
bringing the entire business in custodia legis."
Based on that information, I ran three separate models using in
sequence, MAS, TX, and NY as geographic variables. If legal systems
were the only factor driving the results, the expectation would be that
MAS would be weakly significant if at all, TX would have a positive
influence on bankruptcy filings, and NY would have the strongest positive
influence on bankruptcy filings. The regressions provide little support for
that framework: MAS is not significant, TX is highly significant, but NY
is not significant. Goodness-of-fit tests show no significant improvement
from use of MAS and NY over a model without a location variable; the
TX variable showed an improvement only in some of the runs. On the
other hand, the small number of cases for those states suggests that little
weight should be put on the limited significance revealed by the data
analysis.

106. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003). The anecdotal
evidence of that transaction is not inconsistent with my statement above that I found no Texas ABCs,
as the firm in question was not a firm in my data set.
107. See Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003).
108. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 15 (Consol. 2004).
109. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 19 (Consol. 2004).
110. See City of New York v. U.S., 283 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1960); Florence Trading Corp. v.
Rosenberg, 128 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1942).
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Table 5: Massachusettsand Bankruptcy Rates

Constant
PAT

Coeff

Odds Ratio

-0.58**
(0.223)

0.560

-0.066
__ 0.246

_

0.936

BIOPHARM

0.992*
(0.433)

2.697

COMM

0.365
(0.219)

1.440

SMLEMP

-1.39***
(0.337)

0.250

MEDEMP

-0.84***
(0.251)

0.432

SMLAM

-0.462
(0.351)

0.630

MEDAM

-0.166
(0.247)

0.847

MAS

-0.193
(0.335)

0.825

* p<.05

** p<.01

*** p<.001

N=635
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Table 6: Texas and Bankruptcy Rates
Coeff

Odds Ratio

-0.68**

0.506

-0.083

0.920

BIOPHARM

1.052*
(0432)

2.864

COMM

0.373
(0.220)

1.453

-1.37***
(0.335)

0.254

Constant
PAT

SMLEMP
MEDEMP

-0.78**
.....(0.252)

0.460

SMLAM

-0.522
(0.354)

0.593

MEDAM

-0.174
(0.248)

0.840

TX

0.794*
(0.346)

2.212

* p<.05

**

p<.01

*** p<.001

N=635
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Table 7: New York and Bankruptcy Rates
Coeff

Odds Ratio

Constant

-0.63**
(0.218)

0.530

PAT

-0.040
(0.244)

0.960

BIOPHARM

0.956*
(0.429)

2.601

COMM

0.378
(0.219)

1.459

SMLEMP

-1.38***
(0.335)

0.253

MEDEMP

-0.82***
(0.250)

0.439

SMLAM

-0.461
(o.352)

0.631

MEDAM

-0.163
(0.247)

0.850

NY

0.286
(0.428)

1.331

* p<.05

** p<.01

*** p<.001

N=635

In the end, the data analysis is not sufficiently clear to justify a view
that attributes the pattern of filing entirely to law or culture. Thus, I find
the most plausible explanation to be that the pattern is a combination of
both law and culture: firms often avoid ABCs in states that do not have a
legal system that is hospitable to those filings, but even if the legal system
is hospitable, there is a considerable learning curve that makes those
filings less customary in locations where the relevant professionals have
less experience dealing with failed venture investments.
b. Location and Type of Bankruptcy Filing
The next question I tried to investigate was the relation between
location and the type of bankruptcy filing. The purpose of this inquiry was
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to understand in which types of cases the ABC process might be preferred
to bankruptcies. The interviews suggested two conflicting hypotheses.
First, firms that are small in the sense of having too few liquid assets
would not use an ABC process because of the substantial minimum fee
that a major ABC firm takes for doing the assignment."' Second, firms
that are more complex do not use an ABC process because it cannot be
used to sustain an operating business for a substantial period. 1 2 Generally,
some interview subjects suggested that ABCs should be a substitute for
Chapter 7 filings except in relatively small cases, and should not be a
substitute for Chapter 11 filings.' 13 Because all of the firms were venturebacked and thus (at least at one point in time) had substantial assets, I
doubted that many of them would have been too small at the time of
failure for an ABC. Accordingly, I approached the data with the
hypothesis that ABCs were a substitute for Chapter 7 filings, but not for
Chapter 11 filings.
The data supported that hypothesis with respect to Chapter 7. First, to
test the relation between location and Chapter 7 filings, I ran a logistic
regression using the same variables as above, but compared firms that did
not file for bankruptcy with firms that filed for Chapter 7. As the table
below illustrates, location in California was highly significant, with a
negative coefficient and low odds ratio, indicating a lower likelihood of
Chapter 7 filings.ll4

111. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003).
112. See id.
113. See id.; Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone
Interview with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003).
114. A similar regression, which I do not report here, produced similar but less significant results
from a comparison of finns that filed for Chapter 7 to those firms that did not. Two parallel regressions
using NO CAL instead of CA also produced similar results with a lower degree of significance for the
location variable.
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Table 8: California and Chapter 7 Filings
Coeff

Odds Ratio

Constant

-0.83**
(0.272)

0.434

PAT

-0.040
(0.313)

0.960

BIOPHARM

0.920
(0.482)

2.510

COMM

-0.271
(0.294)

0.763

SMLEMP

-1.00*
(0.394)

0.367

MEDEMP

-0.623*
(0.324)

0.536

SMLAM

-0.476
(0.419)

0.621

MEDAM

-0.05
E0.316)

0.951

CA

-0.77**
(0.268)

0.461

* p<.05

** p<.01

*** p<.001

N=572

[VOL. 82:1375
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Table 9: Texas and Chapter 7 Filings
Coeff

Odds Ratio

1.15***
(0.266)

0.317

PAT

-0.166
(0.313)

0.847

BIOPHARM

1.033*
(0.482)

2.810

COMM

-0.293
(0.293)

0.746

SMLEMP

-0.969*
(0.394)

0.379

MEDEMP

-0.605
(0.321)

0.546

SMLAM

-0.531
(0.420)

0.588

MEDAM

-0.095
(0.310)

0.910

TX

0.830*
(0.406)

2.292

Constant

* p<.05

**

p<.01

*** p<.001

N=572
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Conversely, as you would expect from the data reported above, the data
from Texas show a similar degree of significance, but in this case the
positive coefficient and
elevated odds ratio indicates a greater likelihood
15
filings.'
7
Chapter
of
The data related to Chapter 11, however, did not support the hypothesis
that location would not affect Chapter 11 filings. As it happens, the effect
on Chapter 11 filings is about the same as the effect on Chapter 7 filings.
The tables below illustrate those results for California (where Chapter 11
filings are depressed even more strongly than Chapter 7 filings)" 6 and
Texas (where Chapter 11 filings are elevated). 1 7 The Texas findings do
fall short of statistical significance, but the positive coefficient and
elevated odds ratio is consistent with the other findings.

115. A similar regression, which I do not report here, produced similar but less significant results
from a comparison of firms that filed for Chapter 7 to those firms that did not. Parallel regressions with
respect to Massachusetts were inconclusive, much like the Massachusetts model reported above.
116. See supra note 114.
117. See supra note 115.
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Table 10. Californiaand Chapter 11 Filings
Coeff
Constant

Odds Ratio

-1.47***
(0.336)

0.230

PAT

0.175
(0.345)

1.191

BIOPHARM

1.128
(0.740)

3.088

COMM

1.32***
(0.326)

3.734

SMLEMP

-2.38***
(0.658)

0.093

MEDEMP

-1.09**
(0.368)

0.337

SMLAM

-0.376
(0.628)

0.687

MEDAM

-0.284
(0.358)

0.753

-0.956**
(0.319)

0.384

CA

* p<.05

** p<.01

*** p<.001

N=553
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Table 11: Texas and Chapter 11 Filings
Coeff
Constant

-1.83***

Odds Ratio
0.160

(0.3301
PAT

0.021

1.021

(0.,337)
BIOPHARM

1.142

3.133

(0.731)
COMM

1.24***

3.461

(0321)
SMLEMP

-2.29***
(0.646)

MEDEMP

-1.02"*
(0.364)

SMLAM

-0.420

0.101

0.359
______

0.657

(0.621)
MEDAM

-0.286

0.751

(0.351)
TX

0.642
(0.506)

1.899

................................... . ..........................................................................
N=553
*** p<.001
** p<.01
* p<.05
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Thus, the data suggest that something in California-and the use of
ABCs certainly seems to be the most obvious answer-is removing a8
portion of filings from both the Chapter 7 and the Chapter 11 docket."
My intuition is that this reflects the fact that the distinction between a
Chapter 7 filing and a Chapter 11 filing in practice is not as stark as the
data suggest. On reflection, this seems to make sense given the nature of
the data set. For one thing, because all of the firms are relatively small, the
need for Chapter 11 based on size and complexity alone is relatively
uncommon. Thus, within the data set, the use of Chapter 11 often is a
liquidation device much like Chapter 7.119 Many of the Chapter 11 filings
either involve sales of property under Section 363120 or liquidating
plans.' 21 For another, to the extent that the assignee is important because
of the assignee's ability to keep the employees attached to the business
long enough to sell it,122 the ABC procedure operates as a low-cost
privately ordered reorganization. From that perspective, it should provide
a method for simple sales of businesses that would be too small to bear the

118. 1 also tried to separate a set of "successful" Chapter II s to see if the relation would hold
against that set. I had some difficulty in defining success for this set of Chapter IIs, all of which were
filed since 2001 and many of which are ongoing. See I NAT'L BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM'N,
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 611 (1997) (discussing difficulty in defining success). I
settled on excluding clearly unsuccessful bankruptcies, and I included the bankruptcies for which a
plan was proposed that has been confirmed or is still pending (39 of 68 Chapter I Is). The model
showed no significant influence for the location variable. Given the small numbers with which I was
working (39), however, I ultimately decided that the line of inquiry was not probative.
119. This finding is consistent with the findings in Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supranote 3.
120. Sales of property under Section 363 is a possibility discussed in the interviews as a way in
which an assignment might be a substitute for a Chapter II proceeding. See Telephone Interview with
Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003).
121. It is plain that all involved would prefer a sale of the business under Section 363 rather than a
liquidating plan, largely because of the transaction costs of complying with the procedures for
approval of a plan. Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). The
decision of the Second Circuit in In re Lionel Corp. (Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Lionel
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983), suggested that such sales might be appropriate in relatively
narrow circumstances ifa substantial justification is apparent. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1066-72.
In recent years, however, practice seems to have allowed the Lionel exception almost to swallow the
rule, so that Section 363 sales of the entire business have become quite common; most courts will not
insist on full adoption of a liquidating plan. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney
(Mar. 30, 2004); Email from Second California Attorney (Mar. 29, 2004). Interestingly, many of the
firms that conduct Section 363 sales nevertheless file and confirm plans of reorganization, instead of
converting the cases to Chapter 7 and liquidating under that Chapter. In my data set, for example,
Chapter II plans followed Section 363 sales in at least ten cases (Sphera Optical Networks, Phylos,
Flashcom, BroadBand Office, lnternetConnect, Digital BroadBand, Cambrian Communications,
Onsite Access, Protarga, PointOne Telecommunications). There appear to be only three cases of
Section 363 sales followed by a conversion to Chapter 7 (Nanovation, Fastech, HydraWeb
Technologies).
122. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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costs of a Chapter 1 proceeding. 123 Thus, in the end, there may be little
substantive distinction between the use of Chapter 11 and Chapter 7, at
least with respect to the value of the ABC procedure as a substitute. I
explore the implications of those findings in the next part of the Article.
c. Size and Bankruptcy Filing
The final topic I examined was the relation between size and Chapter
filings. As discussed above, the interviews and the bankruptcy filing data
suggest that ABC filings are siphoning off the smaller firms from each
Chapter. 124 The interviews generally suggested that the California-style
ABC works better for firms that have smaller and simpler affairs, both
because of the lower likelihood of complex disagreements among
stakeholders and because of the lower likelihood of important preference
litigation. For Chapter 11 filings, the interviews strongly suggested that
only larger firms could bear the substantial costs of those proceedings. 125
To the extent the data above indicate that there is little distinction between
the two Chapters, the regressions should show similar size effects for both
Chapters.
That in fact is the case. As discussed briefly above, I collected two
different proxies for size: employees and amount financed. In each case, I
divided the firms into three sectors (small, medium, and large employees
and amounts raised). In each of the tables reported above, SMLEMP is
statistically significant, with a coefficient and odds ratio indicating that
bankruptcy filings are less common than for the remainder of the data set.
MEDEMP is occasionally significant, though always with less influence
than SMLEMP. Finally, the variables for amounts generally are not
significant, suggesting that the number of employees is 1a26better proxy for
the terminal size of the firm than the total amount raised.

123. See Telephone Interview with Third California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003) (suggesting that it
would not be plausible to use a Chapter 11 for a business that would have assets worth less than $15
million).
124. That assumes, as I suggested above, that none of my firms are too small for a California-style
ABC.
125. See supra note 123.
126. That makes some sense given the way that the variables are collected. The number for
employees reflects the number of employees as of the last time that VentureOne collected a report
from the firm, generally some time in the last quarter of the firm's operations. That is probably a better
proxy for size and complexity as of the firm's failure than the total amount raised during the firm's
lifetime.
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III. IMPLICATIONS

The data described above seem to me interesting and informative in
their own right. They also, however, have some obvious implications for
bankruptcy policy. Specifically, the data directly raise the question
whether other states should adopt a process similar to the California-style
ABC described above. More generally, because the data provide some
information on the reasons that firms choose bankruptcy from the
available liquidation options, they shed light both on the various bodies of
literature that have articulated views about the role that the bankruptcy
process plays in dealing with the failure of firms in our economy, and on
potential improvements of that process.
A. Alternatives to Bankruptcy
The most interesting possibility that the data suggest is that the costs of
financial distress could be lowered if states adopted legal systems that
were as hospitable to the ABC process as the California system. The line
of argument is simple enough. The premise is that the ABC process
dominates in California because it provides a cheaper and more effective
method of dealing with a significant class of failed firms. If that is true,
then other states that adopt similar statutes could produce better results in
their own states: lowering the number of corporate bankruptcies,
increasing the recoveries for creditors of failed firms, and increasing the
speed with which assets and employees of failed firms are redirected to
productive use. 127 Two concerns with that premise are apparent, both of
which warrant further investigation, but neither of which strikes me as
dispositive: protecting nonconsenting creditors and secrecy.
1. Nonconsenting Creditors
The most obvious concern is that the ABC process would harm
nonconsenting creditors. Although more information would be useful, my
current view is to doubt that the problem is significant, at least as things
currently operate in California. For one thing, it seems likely that any
substantial group of creditors harmed by the process could overturn the
results by filing an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. The easy case is

127. The California statutes are by no means unique. See BERMAN, supra note 40. As discussed
above, however, none of the other states with major concentrations of high-technology businesses have
legal systems that are similarly receptive to ABCs.
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secured creditors; interview subjects uniformly recognize that the consent
of secured creditors is a prerequisite to a successful ABC, indeed that the
secured creditors typically control the process in those cases in which
there are not enough assets to repay the secured creditors easily. 28 As
discussed below, however, the particular nature of these firms makes it
relatively unlikely that the secured creditors ordinarily129 are directly
responsible for the decision to put the firm through an ABC.
The position of unsecured creditors is harder to evaluate. Those who
conduct ABCs say that unsecured creditors have the practical ability to
disrupt an ABC, at least if it does not proceed in a way that advances their
interests. 30 The apparent idea is that any substantial group of mistreated
creditors could file an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding and force the
assignee to turn the assets of the failed firm over to the bankruptcy court.
At least in California, however, there is some reason to believe that
bankruptcy judges are not inclined to disrupt ABCs. Thus, at least from
the perspective of turnaround professionals, it is commonplace for
bankruptcy judges faced with a bankruptcy that is filed in response to a
well-administered ABC to abstain and dismiss the bankruptcy proceeding
under Bankruptcy Code § 305.13' That understanding seems plausible: the
relevant statute directs courts to consider whether "the interests of
creditors and the debtor would be better served by ...dismissal,"'' 32 which

128. See Telephone Interview with First California Attorney (Oct. 27, 2003); Telephone Interview
with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003); Telephone Interview with Fourth California
Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19,
2003). One California attorney explained to me that secured creditors often prefer an ABC to a
foreclosure because the assignee is likely to produce more value than the secured creditor's own
personnel. That is true, he explained, both because of the greater ease with which the assignee can
package assets with the relevant personnel, and because of the experience of the assignee in locating
and dealing with buyers for technology-related assets. See Telephone Interview with Second California
Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004). A lender emphasized the difficulties lenders face in selling those assets
because of the reluctance of institutional lenders to make the requisite representations and warranties.
See Telephone Interview with Texas Lender (Oct. 29, 2004); Telephone Interview with Third
California Attorney (Nov. 3, 2003). Although it is not clear that the distinction is entirely rational,
purchasers in ABC transactions apparently are more willing to forego reliable assurances of that
nature.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 178-86.
130. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003).
131. See Kupetz, supra note 40, at 75-78; Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround
Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003) (discussing two such cases dismissed under Bankruptcy Code
§ 305); Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004) (describing "[m]any,
many, many" of those cases involving his firm and stating that he could not remember an involuntary
bankruptcy filed against one of his firm's assignments that was not dismissed).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (2000). Courts are emboldened by legislative history indicating that
abstention is appropriate when "an arrangement is being worked out by creditors and debtors out of
court, there is no prejudice to the rights of creditors in that arrangement, and an involuntary case has
been commenced by a few recalcitrant creditors to provide a basis for future threats to extract full
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a court readily could determine to be the case when a competent assignee
is involved.
Finding objective support for that thesis, however, is more difficult.
Reported decisions in such cases are scant-and there are not any from
California. That is not to say, however, that the issue does not arise with
some frequency. As indicated below, even this small data set indicates that
bankruptcy judges plainly do not write opinions in each case where this
problem arises. At least one of the interviews suggested a less favorable
view of ABCs: one California attorney explained that in his view
California bankruptcy judges in fact are hostile to ABCs and keep cases
whenever there is any substantial claim that would warrant use of the
bankruptcy process, such as preferences that need to be pursued (a topic I
discuss in more detail below). 133 Even that explanation, however, involves
a willingness to intervene only to expedite litigation involving the debtor
(a subject also discussed below), not a willingness to intervene to secondguess business and liquidation decisions of the assignee. The same subject
went on to suggest that courts are particularly unlikely to write opinions
when they deny motions to dismiss. To the extent those comments reflect
a consistent pattern, it is plausible to think that the opinion-reporting
process rather than unanimity in decided cases caused my difficulty in
finding any such opinions. 134 Still, it is plain that a number of courts have
abstained in those circumstances. 135 I have not located any reported
opinion rejecting a motion to dismiss that is filed by an assignee in an
ABC. Moreover, interviews with three experienced California bankruptcy
judges-none of whom had ever seen a case in which an assignee sought
such a ruling-strongly suggest that turnaround professionals overestimate
the extent to which bankruptcy judges have a decided views about the
process.
It happens-perhaps fortuitously, given what I was told in interviews
with judges-that one of the California bankruptcies in the data set
involves that scenario. Four creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 11
proceeding against Pluris, Inc. in August of 2002.136 Previously, the firm
had made a voluntary assignment under an ABC procedure to Sherwood

payment." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 325 (1977) (quoted in In re Cincinnati Gear Co., 304 B.R. 784
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003)).
133. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004).
134. See id.

135. See, e.g., In re Bailey's Beauticians Supply Co., 671 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1982); In re
Cincinnati Gear Co., 304 B.R. 784 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003); In re Artists' Outlet, Inc., 25 B.R. 231
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re M. Egan Co., 24 B.R. 189 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982).
136. This information is from the bankruptcy court's docket sheet.
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Partners, Inc., a prominent California firm that often serves as an
assignee. 137 In September of 2002, Sherwood Partners, Inc. filed a motion
seeking abstention and dismissal. After a November 2002 hearing, the
motion was granted on January 3, 2003, resulting in dismissal of the
bankruptcy. The court explained that the bankruptcy proceeding
apparently had been filed by a creditor that sought to take control of the
debtor in Chapter 11 to gain access to the tax attributes of the failed entity.
The court also expressed skepticism about the viability of the creditor's
proposed Chapter 11 plan, as well as the concern that a Chapter 11
proceeding would38 involve wasted expenses that in the end would not
benefit creditors.
Without more information, it is difficult to assess the role that
bankruptcy courts play in protecting minority creditors in ABCs. On the
one hand, reluctance of bankruptcy judges to intervene could result in an
ABC process that is harmful to creditors by leaving no practical
mechanism by which unsecured creditors can use the bankruptcy process
to protect themselves. Conversely, it could be viewed as yet another
empirical data point indicating that the ABC process is producing such a
clearly positive return for creditors as a group that bankruptcy judges are
reluctant to intervene. Of course, even if judges are declining to intervene
on the theory that intervention would not aid creditors (the position of the
judge in Pluris), that does not prove that the system is working optimally.
It is possible, of course, that creditors would have gotten a better outcome
had the firm initially filed for bankruptcy, but a bankruptcy that comes
after much of the liquidation has been conducted by the assignee can only
make matters worse. I obviously do not have enough evidence to take a
conclusive view on that point.
My intuition, however, is that the more benign understanding is better.
After all, bankruptcy judges have no good reason to abstain if they think
the process is harming creditors. Whatever Section 305 means, it is
difficult to say that it requires a judge to abstain in deference to an ABC
that the judge views as harmful. 139 Even the interview subject discussed
above suggested only that bankruptcy judges would retain the cases if
there was a substantial need for the bankruptcy process, not that

137. See Goncharoff, supra note 60. For information on Sherwood, see http://www.shrwood.com
(last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
138. Copies of the relevant portions of the file are on file with the author.
139. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney Interview (Mar. 30, 2004)
(suggesting that bankruptcy courts would be receptive in cases in which creditors have a "real
grievance").
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bankruptcy judges would overturn ABCs simply because a creditor asked
them to.' 40 That understanding resonates with my discussion below, which
contends that the ABC process in California has evolved to serve the cases
where bankruptcy has no useful role, and that bankruptcy continues to be
used in the substantial set of cases where it has functional value.
It is particularly important in assessing California-style ABCs to notice
that the statute directly protects the principal creditors that would receive
priority payments in a bankruptcy proceeding. The California statute
includes provisions, modeled on Bankruptcy Code § 502(b), that require
assignees to make payments to priority creditors much like a trustee in
bankruptcy. 14 It is not clear how effective those are in practice, and it is
clear that the list of priorities is much shorter than in the federal
Bankruptcy Code, 142 but their existence provides some assurance for those
creditors.
More directly, aside from the ability of creditors to use the bankruptcy
process to overturn the results of ABCs, the actions of assignees are
policed by the behavior of creditors dissatisfied with the process.
Doubtless the most important possibility is that assignees that do not
perform well will lose business. The market in California is highly
concentrated, the relevant players (entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and
lenders) are all likely to be repeat players, and a failure to perform well is
likely to be quite evident to all. Thus, there is some reason to believe that
reputational constraints will have a substantial effect on assignees. Thus,
even in California it is clear that some creditors have a decidedly negative
view of the ABC process and that they tolerate ABCs only where they
43
have confidence that the assignee will protect their interests actively.
For some assignees (like CMA-the California affiliate of the National
Association of Credit Managers), that is feasible because of a long
tradition as a creditor representative. For others, that is accomplished
through close relational ties to the community of venture investors and
lenders. The Massachusetts interviews show how important those

140. See id.
141. See Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004) (discussing
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1204-1204.5) (West 1982 & Supp. 2005)).
142. The priorities under California law are limited to employees, pension creditors, and certain
tax payments. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1204-1204.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005). Thus, the
possibility that creditors that would receive priority payments in bankruptcy will receive nothing in an
ABC is at least plausible. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004).
Given the frequency with which priority creditors go unpaid in bankruptcy, however, it is not clear that
this should be a major concern. I note that none of my Chapter II schedules indicated priority claims
that predated bankruptcy for anything other than wages, pension contributions, and taxes.
143. See Telephone Interview with Fifth California Attorney (Jan. 7, 2005).
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constraints are to a functioning system: in the more dispersed community
there, the actions of what seem to have been a few unreliable assignees
the assignment
apparently have poisoned the community in general against 144
firms.
high-tech
of
disposition
rapid
for
as a routine vehicle
Most conventionally, there is, of course, the possibility that disaffected
creditors will sue an assignee for failure to perform adequately.
Surprisingly enough, the legal standard that would govern such an action
is unclear. One lawyer opined to me that the duty of the assignee is a
straightforward contractual obligation formed in the contract with the
assignor.145 It seems to me likely, however, that a court faced with
substantial claims of misconduct would conclude that an assignee has a
fiduciary duty to creditors. 146 The reason that standard is not clear is
evident from the discussion above. As one attorney explained, disaffected
creditors have little incentive to litigate about what the assignee's standard
of care is when they have the ready ability to file an involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding in which they can overturn the entire assignment
process if147 they can establish some substantial need for judicial
oversight.
2. Secrecy
The second concern relates to the secrecy of the process. Several of the
interviews suggested that secrecy is a motivating factor for using the ABC
process. It is not clear how important this is,' 48 but it is something that
some people mention as having some import in some cases. The basic
point is that the process can be accomplished quickly, without a public
filing, and often without any public notoriety. Indeed, one of the reasons it

144. See supranotes 89-94 and accompanying text.
145. Email from Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 29, 2004);
Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30. 2004).
146. 1 rely on the typical statement to the effect that "[iut is the duty of the assignee in the
performance of his trust to defend this property against all unjust adverse claims" or that the assignee
is "trustee for all the creditors." Credit Managers Ass'n v. Nat'l Independent Bus. Alliance, 162 Cal.
App. 3d 1166, 1171, 1172 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Mechanics Bank of Richmond v. Rosenberg, 201
Cal. App. 2d 419, 424 (1962) (describing assignee as holding a "trust for the benefit of creditors");
Brainard v. Fitzgerald, 3 Cal. 2d 157, 163 (1935) (validating general assignment for the benefit of
creditors because it is "made for the benefit of creditors generally").
147. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004) (suggesting that
bankruptcy courts would be receptive in cases in which creditors have a "real grievance").
148. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003) ("1 don't think
notoriety is the driving force on these things. I think it is purely economic."); Telephone Interview
with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003) ("There's also sometimes been played up, in some of
the articles or interviews that I've been involved with, the lower level of publicity. But that's not
something that I really promote or necessarily think that is really such a big deal.").
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is so difficult to collect information about the frequency of ABCs is that
newspaper reports by uninformed reporters may describe an ABC as a sale
of the firm without any understanding that it reflects a failure and
insolvency. The instinct to protect confidentiality is also evidenced by the
unwillingness of turnaround firms to identify for me the firms for which
they had done ABCs: they would tell me how many firms in my data set
had been their customers, but not which ones-even when I already knew
that the firms had failed. Thus, it is plain that there is some stigma
associated with the process.
Absent some specific statutory obligation of publicity, however, it is
not obvious to me why a process that allows a firm to fail quietly is
inherently bad. There is, of course, a fine line between improper "secrecy"
and simply being reticent to publicize an embarrassing event. As one of
the leading turnaround professionals explained:
I don't think it's done for secrecy. I think it's done for more public
relations, concern about future business and the perception of it
more than anything of bankruptcy. That's what I get from most
people. ... It's interesting because I don't like the word, secret. I
don't think it's a real secret. If I have creditors who call and ask me,
"What's going on? What was the sale? What happened?" I tell
them. So from that perspective I don't look at it as secret because
creditors have a right to know what's happening, and when they are
49
going to get paid, and what the distribution was. 1
The biggest concern is that such a process might have an adverse effect
50
on a creditor that did not in fact receive notice. As discussed above,1
however, it seems unlikely to me that the process would bind such a
creditor. My impression is that the process works relatively well in this
context because the businesses are sufficiently young and simple in their
operations that the likelihood of large unknown creditors is small. My
interview subjects-admittedly not the most reliable source since they do
not represent creditors that have not received notice-suggest that the
problem of omitted creditors is not a major one. For one thing, they think
that major creditors are highly likely to learn of the process before funds
are distributed. 15' The only major creditors likely to be negligent enough
to fail to notice the closure of their debtor for the greater part of a year
appear to be tax creditors, and for various reasons assignees seem to have

149. Telephone Interview with Fourth Turnaround Professional (June 18, 2004).
150. See supra note 42.
151. See Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003).

1424

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 82:1375

strong reasons to make sure that tax creditors are paid. 152 Thus, it surely is
the case that some creditors, some of the time, will be prejudiced by
failure to receive notice of an ABC. It does not appear, however, based on
the limited information I have, to be a major problem in practice.
A related point is that the use of an ABC instead of a bankruptcy
allows the officers of the failed firm to avoid the need to make disclosures
required by securities laws when directors of a failed firm previously have
filed for bankruptcy. 53 If we assume that the rules requiring those
disclosures reflect a policy choice that it is important to the investment
markets to know if officers and directors previously have been involved
with failed companies, then the ability of those officers and directors to
use this process to avoid that obligation could be problematic. Still, the
SEC could readily revise its rules to extend them to cover ABCs explicitly
if it wished to do so.
In sum, although it is appropriate to be skeptical about a process
dominated by the debtor and its major creditors, I am not persuaded that
there is a serious reason for concern about the process in this context.
Given the obvious cost savings that it produces, it seems to me that it is at
least worth considering whether it would be beneficial for other states to
follow California's lead here. The most difficult problem would be trying
to avoid the breakdown in trust that has disrupted the use of the procedure
in Massachusetts. It might be hard, however, to replicate that system in
contexts that do not share the basic structure of the Silicon Valley hightech community: a highly concentrated and interrelated set of actors,
including boards of failed companies making liquidation choices,
controlled by venture-capital investors that have repeat-player reasons for
wanting to ensure that a small group of repeat-player secured creditors are
treated fairly. I do not intend to resolve these questions here. There are of
course important bankruptcy policies implicated by a concerted effort by
states to develop procedures that would shift the liquidation of failed firms
from a federal forum specifically designed to protect creditors to a state
process specifically designed to avoid judicial oversight. 54 1 intend only to

152.

See supra note 42.

153. See Telephone Interview with Second Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003);
Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004). The regulation in question
is Item 401 (f)(1) of Regulation S-K, which requires disclosure of involvement in certain bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f)(1) (2004). Given the general vagueness of
disclosure requirements in securities laws, it is a bit surprising to me that California lawyers are so
certain that involvement in ABCs need not be disclosed, but the interviews suggest in practice a bright
line between the two types of proceedings.
154. For a preliminary discussion of the general problem, see Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
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underscore the possibility that a state process can play a useful role in
lowering the costs in a substantial part of the overall volume of failed
firms, and the parallel need to ensure that any such system is designed in a
way (as the current systems do) that permit creditors to protect themselves
from the ABC process if it treats them unfairly.
B. The Role of Bankruptcy
A substantial part of current bankruptcy literature focuses on what role
bankruptcy plays in the liquidation and reorganization of failing firms.
Douglas Baird and Bob Rasmussen, in their work on the "End" and
"Twilight" of bankruptcy, have underscored a decline in the traditional use
of Chapter 11 as a venue for negotiating and working out a plan for
reorganization of a complex business. 155 Lynn LoPucki has criticized that
explanation, 56 but even his responses do not seem to undercut the notion
that Chapter I l's role in its maturity is quite different from its role in the
1980s.1 57 Because so many firms continue to file for Chapter 11, there is
something of a void in our understanding of exactly why firms file for
Chapter 11.
This research contributes to that subject in three ways. First, because it
provides a rare opportunity to examine a population of failed firms to see
which of those firms file for bankruptcy, it gives some limited insight into
why firms choose to file for bankruptcy instead of using one of the other
options available to them. Second, by shedding some light on the efficacy
of liquidation and sale of businesses in ABCs and in bankruptcy, this
research provides limited support for an optimistic view of current practice
that undermines the calls for high-speed mandatory auctions supported by
several groups of bankruptcy scholars. Third, by illuminating the problems
with bankruptcy that cause firms to choose ABCs, it offers some guidance
about potential avenues for improvement in the bankruptcy process.

Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2003, at 150.
155. Baird & Rasmussen, The End, supra note 2; Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 3.
Baird's paper with Ed Morrison contributes to that literature as well by suggesting that bankruptcy
decisionmaking about the optimal stopping of firms is better than might have been thought. Baird &
Morrison,supra note 3. For an empirical extension of that work, see Morrison,supra note 3.
156. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Reply to Baird and Rasmussen's The
End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645 (2003).
157. David Skeel's work reflects a similar perspective on the differences in practice as Chapter 11
has matured. E.g., David A. Skeel, Creditor's Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in
Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003).
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It is true, of course, that the data set presents a narrow slice of the
Chapter 11 universe. 58 Still, a data set concentrated on bankruptcies of
this particular size sheds considerable light on the role of bankruptcy
because of the unique opportunity to examine how firms of a particular
sort use bankruptcy. Indeed, the particular features of this data set make it
useful for examining these questions. Among other things, the data set
includes a homogenous set of firms all of whom are represented by
counsel, all of whom have relatively sophisticated equity investors, and
none of whom face any of the problems unique to public companies. 59 By
removing the distractions of unsophisticated borrowers and creditors and
the distortions that securities laws impose on firm conduct, the data set
makes it possible to look exclusively at the value of using the bankruptcy
process to resolve the various problems of a failing firm.
1. Summary Data
I start by providing a few summary statistics about the bankruptcy files
I have examined to put in context the analysis in the sections that follow.
The data draws on the schedules from 62 of the Chapter 11 cases in the
60
data set. 1
Assets: The first question is what assets remained for these firms by the
time that they filed. The simplest number to report would be the total

158. As mentioned above, supra note 3, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook are
involved in a major project that involves a sample of all Chapter I Is. Their work will provide a much
better understanding of the universe of Chapter 11 filings.
159. For example, one of the interview subjects noted that public firms do not use the ABC
process because they would have to obtain shareholder approvals that are unnecessary for a
bankruptcy filing. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Dec. 9, 2003). That
suggests some difficulty in relying on data about the filings of public firms to learn much about the
functions that the system serves. On that point, the position of an ABC in the gray area between a sale
of assets and an insolvency proceeding has produced an interesting dynamic. As the interview subjects
suggest, it commonly is said that you need shareholder approval to accomplish an ABC. Historically,
though, there is some support for the notion that an assignment can be accomplished without
shareholder approval. See In re E.T. Russell Co., 291 F. 809 (D. Mass. 1923). Accepting the received
wisdom from the interviews, however, raises the question of whether it is appropriate for bankruptcy
to be used for the sole reason of avoiding shareholder approval requirements that would limit the
ability to use an ABC. It may be that the bankruptcy process in effect serves as a form of shareholder
approval that resolves any corporate governance concerns. Still, the role of shareholder approval in
guiding firms into the formal bankruptcy process is troubling. The question of course relates to the
broader question that is surfacing in recent literature regarding the possibility that managers of an
insolvent firm owe their duty to creditors rather than to shareholders. See generally Jonathan C.
Lipson, Directors' Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the FinanciallyDistressedCorporation,
50 UCLA L. REv. 1189 (2003).
160. There were a total of 66 Chapter 11 cases. Three firms filed no schedules and I was unable to
obtain the schedules from one of the firms.
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assets as reported on the schedules. It is clear, however, that different
firms used different protocols for deciding how to fill out their schedules.
Many firms, including some with substantial patent portfolios, simply
attributed no value at all to their intellectual property,' 61 while others
attributed substantial value to such assets specifically. 62 To give some
objectivity to the data, I decided to collect both the total amount of assets
and the tangible assets specifically. 163 Table 12 provides summary data on
a substantial asset base for these firms,
those points. Generally, it suggests
164
even excluding intangible assets.
Table 12: Assets of Chapter11 Firms ($M)
Biopharm
N=3

Software
N=17

Telecom
N=42

Aggregate
N=62

2.1
2.5

6.9
2.3

29.4
9.1

21.9
4.50
60.3

2.2
2.5

13.8
4.3

31.0
9.7

Tangible
Assets
Mean
Median
Standard
Deviation
Total Assets
Mean
Median
Standard
Deviation

_

_

_

j

24.9
8.09
60.9

Liabilities: The nature of the liabilities of the bankrupt firm is much
more interesting, because it relates directly to the scholarship (discussed
above) about the types of firms that might file for bankruptcy. Here,
because the schedules provide insufficient information to break down the
types of lenders in a systematic way, 165 the most useful, replicable

161. Onix and Transcept, for example, each reported no value for their 12-patent portfolios.
162. Cavu and UTM each reported more than $20 million in intangible assets. Given the wide
variation in the value of patents and other intangibles (such as license rights), it is entirely possible that
these reports are accurate. Still, it is also true that there is great imprecision in valuing those assets.
The possibility of over-optimistic valuation by debtors makes it at least instructive as a conservative
baseline to examine the data on the assumption that the intangible assets in fact have no value.
163. For my purposes, tangible assets equal total scheduled assets reduced by amounts listed on
the schedules for intangible assets and other contingent claims.
164. The likelihood remains that the values stated on the schedules for tangible assets overstate
the values that creditors actually obtain from those assets. I do not have adequate information to
evaluate that likelihood for this data set.
165. It is plain, however, that the capital structures are heterogeneous and not sufficiently simple
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information seems to be a breakdown of total liabilities, divided between
claims of secured creditors (that is, the total amount of claims without
regard to collateral) and unsecured creditors. Then, I have broken the
claims of secured creditors into secured claims 166 and deficiency claims.
Similarly, I divide unsecured claims into priority claims and nonpriority
claims. Like the data related to assets, this must be taken cautiously,
because debtors often report that the amounts owed to particular creditors
are unknown. Still, the data on the schedules seems unlikely to overstate
the debtors' obligations.
Table 13 summarizes the data on those points. The most obvious point
is that the overall amount of the liabilities is substantial. Although I
previously have written about the existence of one type of debt for
venture-backed firms-debt extended by banks in a symbiotic relation
with the venture investors-1 67the files reveal a large dollar amount of debt
of all types. 168 Because the nature of the debt differs substantially from file
to file, it is difficult to generalize. Three points, however, seem salient.
First, secured bank lending to these firms (the type of lending I describe in
my prior work) is common: 29 of the 62 files report a secured creditor that
is a bank or recognizably affiliated with a bank. 169 Second, the unsecured
creditors as a group have relatively substantial claims: the average claim is
about $140,000.170 The other obvious generalization is that it seems likely,
recognizing the potential understatement of claims, to think that unsecured

to permit generalization. See Telephone Interview with First California Lender (Feb. 5, 2004) (arguing
that the debt structure of venture-backed firms has increased in complexity since the mid-1990s).
Frequently there are numerous types of secured creditors, including not only banks, but also
substantial equipment lessors, entities that appear to be strategic partners, and entities that appear to be
related to venture debt funds.
166. The calculations are, by necessity, rough. For the sake of simplicity and plausibility, I have
calculated the secured claims on the assumption that intangible assets have no value, that tangible
assets have their scheduled value, and that secured creditors have a claim against all tangible assets.
167. See Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134,
157-61 (1999) [hereinafter Mann, Software Financing].
168. This is contrary to the understanding of some. See supra note 2.
169. 1 cannot report the average amount of bank debt, because a number of the files report
"unknown" for the amounts of debt owed to specific creditors. Although I have less complete financial
information for the firms that did not file for bankruptcy, it is clear from VentureSource that many of
those firms had substantial institutional financing in addition to venture capital equity investments.
The VentureSource data also makes it plain that much of the secured debt was in place at a time when
the firm was not in financial distress. For comparative purposes, I note the different debt structure
found by Franks & Sussman in their database of privately held British companies: domination by a
single bank with a group of small and dispersed trade creditors. Franks & Sussman, supra note 5. As
Franks and Sussman suggest, there is every reason to think that the structure would be different from
country to country, shaped in large part by the bankruptcy systems in each country.
170. For comparison purposes, Warren and Westbrook find a median of $905 in their study of
business cases in Warren & Westbrook, EmpiricalIntervention, supra note 3.
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creditors in many of these cases would have received a substantial

recovery: the scheduled tangible assets for many of the firms substantially
exceed the secured claims and priority claims. There was an excess in 32
cases. The average case (including those with and without excesses) had
an excess of $13.7 million; the median case had an excess of $415,000.
Table 13: Liabilitiesof Chapter11 Firms (SM)
Biopharm
N=3

Software
N=17

Telecom
N=42

Mean

6.9

41.7

48.5

Median
Standard Dev.
Sec'd

5.5

6.6

21.8

0.80
0.18

7.3
2.3

16.0
8.3

Aggregate
N=62

Total Claims
44.6

t
!

12.6
93.9

Creditors
Mean
Median
Standard Dev.

20.3

_

__

I

Sec'd Claims
Mean
Median

12.8
3.2

0.9
0.2

Standard Dev.

J

2.2
1.3

10.3
3.1

7.5
1.7

i

14.6

Def'y Claims
5.1
0

5.2
0
13.4

5.6
0

Mean
Median
Standard Dev.
Unsec'd
Claims

0
0

Mean

6.1

34.4

33.2

Median
Standard Dev.

5.4

2.5

9.4

I

32.2
_

_

92.8

Priority
Claims
Mean

0.08

0.18

0.39

Median
Standard Dev.
Gen'
Unsecured

0.10

0.08

0.09

Mean
Median
Standard Dev.

6.0
5.2

34.2
2.3

32.9
9.3

J

j

0.32

0.09
0.55

31.9
7.0
92.8

_7.2
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2. Why Filefor Bankruptcy?
The unique contribution of this data set is that it gives some glimpse as
to the reasons that firms might choose to file for bankruptcy. I address first
the most common suggestions from recent literature and then turn to the
reasons for selecting bankruptcy that appear from the data.
a. Optimal Stopping
Ed Morrison's forthcoming work and his recent work with Douglas
Baird emphasize the role of bankruptcy courts in making an optimal
decision about whether a firm should be terminated.' 71 Ed Morrison's
empirical work in particular suggests that bankruptcy courts do a better job
than previous scholars might have expected in moving quickly to
terminate firms for which termination is warranted. 172 In his analysis,
shutdown occurs when a judge grants a secured creditor's motion to lift
the automatic stay, a landlord's motion to repossess the debtor's premises,
or a trustee's motion to convert the case to Chapter 7.173 Using that data,
he finds a correlation between the presentation of cash collateral motions
and the length of time before shutdown. 74 The data I examine here do not
contribute to that debate because cash collateral motions were so prevalent
in the Chapter 11 firms 175 and because few of the firms were the subject of
judicial shutdown decisions. It may be that for the kinds of firms Morrison
examines-resting so completely on individual human capital-that a
successful motion to lift the stay by a single creditor often might shut
down the firm. But in the bankruptcy cases examined here, most of the
firms are not in bankruptcy because of a dispute over whether they should
shut down. They are in bankruptcy as a step in the process of redeploying
assets to a more productive use, which often is done by transferring a
portion of the business as a going concern, rather 7than
by closing the
6
business entirely and liquidating the assets piecemeal.1
As discussed below, my working hypothesis (outlined in the textual
paragraphs that follow) is that the overwhelming majority of Chapter 11

171. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 3; Morrison, supra note 3.
172. Although Morrison's model is designed to show that bankruptcy judges make that decision in
an optimal way, it seems to me that the most his data can show is that the decision is made reasonably
quickly. Given the general complaints of delay by bankruptcy courts, quantitative evidence on that
point contributes to the policy debate even if it is wholly descriptive.
173. See Morrison, supra note 3.
174. Id.
175. Cash collateral motions were granted in 30 of my cases.
176. See Morrison, supra note 3.
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filings in this data set reflect firms that are using Chapter 11 to save
money, not in the exercise of a misguided effort to defer liquidation. Thus,
the decision to terminate is not an important role of the bankruptcy court.
Rather, as is well known, the capital structure of the typical venture capital
firm operates to make it relatively unlikely that bankruptcy courts will be
management and investors
called upon to resolve a conflict between
177
regarding the propriety of termination.
The more difficult question, however, is precisely who among the
investors does make that decision. Several of the interview subjects state
specifically that the board of directors of the failing firm makes the
decision. 178 In the context of a venture-backed firm, 179 the board of
directors generally is controlled by the venture capitalists.180 So, in
context, saying that a decision is made by the board is quite different in
this context from saying that it is made by management. To be sure, in
some cases a firm might be liquidated because management decides that
they no longer wish to devote their time to the firm.' 81 In most cases,
however, the firm is likely to liquidate if, and only if, the venture
capitalists decide that they will not advance further equity contributions to
the firm.182 Although the venture capitalists are likely to keep the lenders
fully apprised of details of the deteriorating situation,' 83 any action of
lenders to venture-backed firms to move aggressively against their

177. Two of the most obvious points are: (a) that the venture capitalists are likely to dominate the
board of directors (see infra note 180 and accompanying text); and (b) that the firm is likely to depend
for continued existence on the willingness of venture capitalists to continue funding despite the
absence of any contractual obligation to do so. See, e.g., Smith & Strrmberg, supra note 3; Baird &
Rasmussen, Control Rights, supra note 2, at 956.
178. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone
Interview with Second California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004); Telephone Interview with First Turnaround
Professional (Sept. 21, 2004).
179. One possibility is that different venture capitalists have different preferences about
liquidation alternatives. The interviews did not, however, suggest any such dynamic. For a number of
reasons, it would be difficult to test that point quantitatively with this data set. First, for each firm there
are generally a large number of investors, which makes it difficult to attribute the liquidation decision
for that firm to any single investor. VentureSource does report a "lead investor," but the population of
lead investors is so unconcentrated (I have more than 400 in the data set) that it would be difficult to
detect differences in liquidation preferences among lead investors.
180. See id.; Telephone Interview with First Professional Turnaround (Sept. 23, 2004); Fourth
California Attorney Interview (Sept. 23, 2004). VentureSource reports the affiliation of board
members of the portfolio firms. Although generalizations necessarily are imprecise, it is unusual for a
firm in the data set to have a board of directors that is not controlled by venture capital investors.
181. See Telephone Interview with First Professional Turnaround (Sept. 21, 2004).
182. See Mann, Software Financing,supra note 167, at 157-61.
183. See Telephone Interview with Third California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004); Telephone Interview
with Venture Investor (Apr. 16, 2004) ("[Tlhat's why I work so hard [in a liquidation of a portfolio
firm], so ... Silicon Valley Bank would be willing to lend to us again.").
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borrowers is likely to be predicated on a decision of venture capitalists to
stop contributing. 184 Moreover, in the unusual case in which lenders
attempt to liquidate a firm that in the opinion of venture capitalists should
not be liquidated, the venture capitalists ordinarily can sustain the firm by
paying off the amounts owed to the lenders. 185 Thus, my impression is that
in practice the decisions about the timing and process for liquidation are
influenced significantly-if86not dominated-by the views of the venture
capitalists, not the lenders.'
b. Reorganizing
The classic justification for Chapter 11 is to provide an active forum
for negotiation among interested parties over the appropriate structure of a
reorganized firm.' 87 As suggested above, 88 several scholars have
contended that the role of Chapter 11 has shifted, so that reorganization is
no longer a substantial function of Chapter 11. Not surprisingly, given the
homogenous set of firms in the data set, there was little variation on that
point in the files. Whether the case was nominally filed in Chapter 7 or in
Chapter 11, the bankruptcy process was used to liquidate the firm, not to
retain control in a reorganization. For one thing, because of the relatively
simple capital structure typified by these firms,' 89 there is little need to use

184. See Mann, Software Financing,supra note 167, at 157-61; Telephone Interview with First
Turnaround Professional (Sept. 21, 2004); Telephone Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Sept.
23, 2004). This is not to say the process is always consensual. In the case of Encore Software, for
example, a Chapter 11 filing was precipitated when a tumultuous meeting between Comerica and the
defaulting borrower caused Comerica to sweep the borrower's accounts. Comerica was paid in full
when the assets of the borrower were sold to Navarre in Chapter 11.
185. See Telephone Interview with First Turnaround Professional (Sept. 21, 2004). This assumes,
as is typically the case, that the investment of the lenders is relatively small compared to the
investment of the venture capitalists. It also is important to my view that the lenders are unlikely to
have any plausible expectation of repayment through liquidation of collateral or the business; their
principal expected source of repayment always will have been the venture capitalists. See Mann,
Software Financing,supra note 167, at 157-61. Thus, this situation is quite different from the typical
situation in which the secured creditor's control is central to the liquidation decision. See Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 62 TEX. L. REv. 795 (2004).
186. For a similar view, see Smith & Stromberg, supra note 3 (asserting that VCs control the
decision to liquidate).
187. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, BargainingAfter the Fall and the Countours of the Absolute
PriorityRule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 738 (1988).
188. See supranotes 155-57 and accompanying text.
189. The capital structure of these firms is highly homogenous. Venture capitalists generally have
a substantial amount of preferred stock, sufficient to control the firm. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note
8, ch. 12; Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 64; Sahlrman, supra note 64. As discussed above, there is a
great deal of debt of various kinds, but in practice that seems not to complicate the process.
Presumably, that is because much of the largest debt is held by parties with sufficient relational ties to
the venture capitalists to minimize the potential for holdup that might lead to contentious negotiation
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bankruptcy to reorganize the capital structure of the firm.'
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For another,

again because of the nature of the data set, the opportunity for third-party
financing is relatively small. 1 9' Generally, institutional lenders that make
loans to firms of this sort depend entirely on the willingness of the venture
capitalists to make future fundings that will be adequate to repay the
loan. 192 Firms of this sort that have filed for bankruptcy, of course, are
firms whose venture capitalists have decided not to make further advances.
Once venture capitalists have made that decision, they tend to be much
more interested in liquidation than in the prospects of a reorganization in
which they could retain an interest in a surviving firm:
Bankruptcy is not even an option. It's just not an option. Venture
capitalists aren't looking to clean up the debt and continue on with
the company for the most part. That's just not the mentality of
venture capitalists. Venture capitalists have the mentality that the
souffl6 only rises once, we gave it a shot, it didn't work, let's get
possible and move on, [in the] cleanest,
out of it in the cleanest way
93
cheapest way possible. 1
In an effort to quantify this point based on the information in the files,
it seems to me that the most relevant question is how often firms that file
for Chapter 11 leave bankruptcy under the control of a person that was an
equity or debt claimant before the proceeding was filed. 194 Using that
about reorganization. See Mann, Software Financing,supra note 167, at 157-61; Mann, supra note 6.
190. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003). That point is, of
course, consistent with the arguments of Baird & Rasmussen in their recent work, cited supra note
155.
191. Thus, post-petition financing is not a major part of the data set. Post-petition financing orders
were entered in 18 of the Chapter 11 cases. This is a contrast to the traditional perception that postpetition financing is a major part of Chapter 11 practice in the modem era, see Skeel, supra note 157.
In addition, see George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-PossessionFinancing,46
VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993) (general discussion of post-petition financing), and especially in
technology bankruptcies, see Scott D. Cousins, Postpetition Financingof Dot-corns, 27 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 759 (2002). Most of the post-petition financing that does appear in these cases derives from funds
contributed by a stalking horse, which are expected to come out of the proceeds of the deal that the
stalking horse hopes to make to acquire control of the company. That was the pattern, for example, in
Digital BroadBand, Onsite Access, Phylos, and BroadBand Office.
192. See Mann, Software Financing,supra note 167, at 157-61; Mann, supranote 6.
193. Telephone Interview with Venture Investor (Apr. 16, 2004).
194. There obviously is considerable ambiguity in distinguishing plans that are "true"
reorganizations from those that are liquidations and sales. Because most of the literature on that
subject involves public firms, there is not a great deal of guidance on how to draw such a line in this
data set. The premise of my analysis is that firms that leave bankruptcy in the control of somebody
entirely new have been sold; those where the capital structure is reshuffled in some way that results in
control by a party that was an investor or creditor before the bankruptcy are closer to reorganizations
as traditionally conceived.
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metric, only four of the bankruptcies involved a conventional
reorganization: 15% of the 26 confirmed plans I have been able to
examine and 8% of the 53 terminated cases that I have been able to
examine. 195
This is not to say that bankruptcy was never used to determine who the
appropriate purchaser should be. For example, stalking horse bids were
apparent at the beginning of several of the cases. It is to suggest, however,
that the bankruptcies ordinarily did not involve negotiation over allocation
of the proceeds of such a sale or any likelihood that the firm would
continue in the control of those that brought it into the bankruptcy
proceeding.
c. Enforcing Pro Rata Treatment
Turning to more important issues in the data set, the dominant
consideration mentioned in the interviews is the need to file bankruptcy to
avoid, or transfer, some interest important to a sale of the firm. Given the
relatively small size of the firms, it is not surprising that none of the cases
used a prepackaged bankruptcy to do this. The most common example in
the interviews-doubtless reflecting my focus on interviews in Palo Alto
and Austin, Texas-is something much simpler, such as an over-priced
lease of office space or production facilities. 196 One turnaround
professional described her typical advice to clients this way: "In many
should
instances I will just say, 'Your leases are just so bad. You really
' ' 197
file a bankruptcy because they will eat up anything you have. ,
This pattern was common in the files as well. For example, Digital
Broadband filed for Chapter 11, rejected a major lease, and then sold much

195. Limitations of this data set make it difficult to tie the work closely into some of the recent
work in the field. For example, recent work by Lynn LoPucki and his co-authors has emphasized the
rate at which plans fail as an important criterion in assessing the effectiveness of the Chapter I I
process. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "'Raceto the Bottom, " 54 VAND. L. REv. 231
(2001); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy
Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1933 (2002). The plans in this data set, however, are too
recent to get any sense for the likelihood that they will fail. In any event, it is not clear how valuable
the information would be. Those papers assume too readily that any rate of failure of reorganized firms
is excessive. See Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the
Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganization, 54 VAND. L. REv. 283 (2001).
196. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003); Telephone
Interview with Fourth California Attorney (Dec. 16, 2003); Telephone Interview with Second
Turnaround Professional (Dec. 17 & 19, 2003); Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround
Professional (Mar. 12, 2004); Telephone Interview with Second California Lender (Apr. 5, 2004).
197. Telephone Interview with Fourth Turnaround Professional (June 18, 2004).
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of the firm to Connecticut Broadband. Similarly, DNA Sciences filed for
Chapter 11 after negotiations with its landlord failed. After rejection of the
lease, the business was sold to Genaissance Pharmaceuticals. The
LayerOne bankruptcy seems to have been filed solely for the purpose of
shedding leases in markets that a contracting firm would no longer serve.
The files also commonly involve the rejection of equipment leases or
contracts for the supply of circuits. In the Darwin Networks case, for
example, the bankruptcy litigation involved rejection of a $20M
equipment lease with Cisco and a series of service contracts with AT&T,
198
followed by a sale of much of the assets of the business to US Wireless.
Similarly, the interviews report, the bankruptcy process is uniquely
capable of permitting a sale that includes a transfer of an executory
contract that otherwise might be terminated because of the general
financial distress of the firm.199 So, for example, EC Cubed seems to have
been in the unusual situation of having a below-market lease to transfer,
instead of an above-market lease to reject. It needed the bankruptcy
process, and the cooperation of its lender (Silicon Valley Bank) to transfer
the lease to a third party.
From some perspectives, that use of the bankruptcy process might be
seen as wholly illegitimate. This paper certainly is not the place for a
general assessment of that question. It is, however, plausible to suggest
that if the provisions that permit avoidance of executory contracts work in
a sensible way, they should have the general effect of ensuring that all
contract creditors share in the diminution of their claims against the failed
firm. 200 The broader point is that the provisions of Section 365 that permit
failed firms to assume, reject, or transfer contracts to third parties reflect a
congressional policy judgment regarding the way in which difficulties
attendant on failure should be spread.2 °1

198. Another common topic of litigation in those cases is whether the leases are "true" leases or
disguised security interests, litigation that the debtors often win. In InternetConnect, for example, the
debtor successfully recharacterized as loans purported leases from Cisco that could not be terminated
during their term and provided for purchase by the debtor for $1 at the end of their term. Cf UCC § 1203(b)(4) (2001) ("A transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if [among other
things,] the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods ... for nominal additional
consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement.").
199. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004).
200. It is of course not at all clear that the provisions function in a sensible way. See, e.g., Michael
T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845
(1988); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV.

227 (1989).
201. To be sure, those provisions are susceptible to abuse when firms that are not insolvent file.
To police that problem, some courts have interpreted the "cause" standard in § 1112 to permit
dismissal of Chapter II bankruptcies if the debtor is not in sufficient distress. In re Integrated Telecom
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My interest is in the effect of those provisions on the liquidation system
as a whole. If all parties were rational, if negotiating were costless, and if
the application of those provisions were entirely predictable, people would
never file for bankruptcy to take advantage of those provisions. The ABC
process (or any other out-of-court workout) would result in an allocation
of claims negotiated in the shadow of the federal provisions. Because
those assumptions are not always true, however, parties often need to use a
judicial process to resolve those problems. The states, of course, cannot
directly adopt statutes to alter contractual rights in that way.20 2 Thus, the
bankruptcy process is the only forum available to enforce a pro rata
distribution of losses attendant on financial distress. Here, a federal forum
is necessary because the parties cannot resolve the issue by contract.
d. Resolving Complex Litigation
The second common example from the interviews is a major preference
or set of preferences that the estate can recover.20 3 Although California's
ABC statute permits assignees to recover preferences on terms similar to
those in the Bankruptcy Code, 20 4 and although assignees report that they
pursue those claims regularly, 0 5 I am persuaded by the assertions in some
of the interviews that the bankruptcy forum provides a cheaper and more
effective forum for that kind of litigation.20 6
It is easy to see how Chapter 11 provides a major benefit on that score.
The ability of a single court to handle what amounts to a series of related
pieces of commercial litigation is a valuable attribute not readily replicated
in a state court system that does not have nationwide authority or any
likelihood of repeat expertise on those questions. 20 7 For example, the main

Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 118-24 (3d Cir. 2004); In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.
1999); Liberate Technologies, 314 B.R. 206 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004). It is doubtful, however, that such
a problem is important in my data set, where all of the firms probably are close to insolvency most of
the time, so that a decision by venture capitalists to send the firm into bankruptcy doubtless carries
with it financial distress and insolvency that should justify the loss-spreading provisions in question.
202. See generally Ronald J. Mann, The Rise of State Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25
CARDOZO L. REv. 1805 (2004) (discussing the boundaries between the legitimate policymaking
spheres of Congress and the states).
203. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003).
204. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1800 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005).
205. See Telephone Interview with Third Turnaround Professional (Mar. 12, 2004).
206. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Oct. 28, 2003).
207. See Telephone Interview with Second California Attorney (Mar. 30, 2004) (explaining that it
is "hard" for a state trial court "to swallow" the idea that it should retract funds received by a creditor
in perfectly legitimate circumstances that amount to a preference under federal bankruptcy law).
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feature of the Asta Networks bankruptcy was a dispute with amazon.com;
the bankruptcy was dismissed shortly after that matter was settled.2 °8
In some cases, the benefits that the bankruptcy court provides are not
so much swift resolution of the dispute as they are a classic benefit of a
stay that can hold the firm in stasis while the litigation is resolved. This
was the case for Napster, when the bankruptcy court provided refuge
pending the Ninth Circuit's ultimately unfavorable resolution of the firm's
litigation with content providers.20 9
e. Industry Effects
One of the most difficult things to understand about the data set is the
strong industry effect: firms in different industries choose bankruptcy
differently and choose between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 differently. A
definitive understanding of those differences would require considerably
more fieldwork. Still, it is easy to offer some general explanations for the
two prominent industry effects that the data indicate. First, the data
indicate that software firms are significantly less likely than the other
firms to file for bankruptcy. As discussed above, decisions like Catapult
make it difficult for software firms to obtain the benefits of bankruptcy
because they cannot assume in-bound technology licenses even while in
bankruptcy. 2'0 Thus, at least as a relative matter, a software firm may less
often receive substantial value for a bankruptcy filing.
Second, although telecom firms do not file bankruptcies at an
unusually high rate compared to firms in the other sectors, when they do
file, they choose Chapter 11 at a rate that is significantly higher than the
rate for firms in the other sectors. Although any generalization is

208.

The hypothesis that the role of the bankruptcy courts in the maturing system is in large part to

resolve complex litigation is in some tension with the rapid decline of bankruptcy trials in recent years.
See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.

913 (2004). In fact, however, the data seems to support my hypothesis when the data on business and
non-business bankruptcy filings is disaggregated, because the disaggregated data suggests that the
number of adversary proceedings filed in business bankruptcy cases has risen steadily over the last
twenty years (from about 0.4 proceedings per case in 1985 to 0.7 in 2002). Id. at 933-34. To be sure,
the share of those proceedings that have resulted in an actual trial has fallen precipitously (from 16%
in 1985 to 3% in 2002). Id. at 935. But that trend probably says less about bankruptcy courts than it
does about litigation in the United States more generally. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial An
Examinationof Trials and Related Matters in Federaland State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
459 (2004) (reporting various indicators of the general decline in recent decades in the use of the civil
trial to resolve litigation).
209. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

210. See supra note 82 (discussing the significance of In re Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at
747).
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necessarily simplifying, many of the telecom firms in the data set were
operating firms with substantial pending executory contracts. They often
were driven into bankruptcy by financial disagreements with suppliers. 21'
In some cases, it might not have been specific disputes with suppliers, but
simply a more general decline in market conditions that made it difficult
for the firm to sustain its existing infrastructure. 2 Chapter 7 for those
firms would have resulted in a substantial loss of going-concern value as
they lost the revenue from ongoing contracts with customers that would
have terminated upon a Chapter 7 filing.21 3 In part, that is a peculiarity of
the regulatory situation of those firms, which imposed substantial penalties
214
on them if they terminated customer service without adequate notice. In
contrast, software and biopharm firms at this stage would less commonly
have large numbers of revenue-generating customers, and thus, as a
11.215
relative matter, would have less occasion to use Chapter
To summarize the thesis of this section, Table 14 illustrates six general
functions that can be important in the liquidation of a failed firm. The first

211. This seems to apply, for example, to 2d Century, Cambrian, and Point One Telecom.
212. Onsite Access is a good example of that situation. After successfully restructuring its affairs
with AT&T and J.P. Morgan, it spent a year unsuccessfully negotiating with GECC and
TransAmerica. The firm filed for bankruptcy to preserve itself during those negotiations and
eventually was sold to ELink.
213. See Steven D. Pohl, Bankruptcies Cast Shadows on Three Embattled Industries, BOSTON
BUS. J., Feb. 3, 2003, available at http://boston.bizjoumals.com/boston/stories/2003/02/03/focus4.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (suggesting that problems with customer contracts often motivate telecom
bankruptcies).
214. This was a major concern, for example, in OnSite Access.
215. Another common characteristic of these files is the importance of preventing utility providers
from terminating contracts with the debtors. Many bankrupt telecommunications firms are
"competitive local exchange carriers" ("CLEC"s), engaged in the business of reselling
telecommunications services purchased from incumbent providers as part of deregulation of the
telecommunications industry. See Patricia Baron Tomasco, Telecom Bankruptcies: Swimming Against
a Tidal Wave (May 16, 2002), available at http://www.brownmccarroll.com/articles_
detail.asp?ArticlelD=47 (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). For those entities, survival is a going concern,
directly dependent on preventing utilities from discontinuing service gives them an important
advantage not available for the analogous suppliers to firms in other sectors. In my data set, prompt
motions on that topic were salient in the cases of BroadBand Office, Colo.com, Darwin Networks, and
InternetConnect.The litigation on that topic presents a complex interplay between the traditional rules
for executory contracts in Section 365 and the special rules of Section 366 for contracts with a
"utility." Section 366 favors the debtor by prohibiting a "utility" from terminating services because of
nonpayment of fees for pre-bankruptcy services, but is adverse to the debtor by requiring it promptly
to post adequate assurance of payment for ongoing services. The application of Section 366 to the
large-scale commercial contracts at issue in these cases remains unclear. See generally Tomasco,
supra. The theoretical propriety of that as a use of bankruptcy is perhaps debatable. See Alan
Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy (Apr. 29, 2004) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=-alea) (last visited Sept.
28, 2004) (arguing that business bankruptcies should not permit debtors to force their suppliers to
continue providing service without payment).
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column lists the functions that contractual negotiations between the parties
can resolve. The last two columns list the functions that the bankruptcy
court necessarily needs to perform.
Table 14: Benefits of Contract and Bankruptcy Liquidation

Loca!tng Purchaser
Setting Price
Defining Capital
Structure
Administering
Estate
Enforcing Pro Rata
Treatment
Resolving Complex
Litigation

Contract
Liquidation
X
X

Bankruptcy
Liquidation

X
X
X
X

3. The Efficacy of the LiquidationSystem
Once we know more about the functions that the bankruptcy process
can-and cannot-serve in a system for the liquidation of failed firms, we
are in a better position to evaluate the functions that Congress has
allocated to the bankruptcy courts. 2116 The most obvious issue is raised by
the weighty body of bankruptcy literature in the 1990s asserting that the
bankruptcy process, particularly Chapter 11, works so poorly that some
form of mandatory auction should replace it. 2t 7 The papers that make that
criticism implicitly rest on the twin assumptions that: (a) the existing
process does a poor job of redirecting assets of failed firms to better uses;

216. This paper advocates a system that allocates the functions necessary for liquidation of failed
firms to the actor best placed to fulfill them. In general, that allocation ultimately should lower the cost
of capital for those firms by lowering the losses attendant on liquidation. See Schwartz, supra note
215.
217. That idea has been promulgated in various forms in four separate lines of scholarship: by
Barry Adler, see, for example, Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing
Corporationsin Bankruptcy, Ill YALE L.J. 83 (2001); Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 811 (1994); Barry E. Adler, Financialand Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993); by Aghion, Hart & Moore, see, for example, Phillippe
Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1994); Phillippe Aghion et al.
The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992); by Lucian Bebchuk, see, for
example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV.
775 (1988); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Using Options to Divide Value in CorporateBankruptcy, 44 EUR.
ECON. REV. 829 (2000); and by Douglas Baird, see, for example, Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting
Auctions in Chapter11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633 (1993).
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and (b) the bankruptcy process needs to do little other than accomplish
that task. The evidence presented in the last section, albeit inconclusive
and anecdotal, undermines both of those assumptions.
The preceding sections of this paper present a system in which ABCs
and bankruptcies are interacting (at least in California), sorting firms to a
forum in which their assets can be redirected rapidly. Two points about
that system are salient here. One, if firms that have no need for
complicated litigation are using ABCs, the sorting function is working.
Two, it appears that the bankruptcy process is serving a variety of
functions that would need to be accomplished even in a mandatory auction
system. Thus, as discussed above, bankruptcies are particularly common
in cases in which recalcitrant creditors (often lessors) are unwilling to
accept the reduction of their rights commensurate with pro rata treatment.
Similarly, it appears common that in the days before failure creditors will
have received preferences. Although it might be optimal to transfer the
assets rapidly (as we see from the ABC process), it remains necessary in
some forum to pursue litigation to recover those preferences. In cases
where that litigation is anything other than trivial, the bankruptcy forum
needs to remain available for that purpose. In cases in which the outcome
of disputed litigation is sufficiently uncertain and important to influence
the ultimate disposition of the firm (Napster being a good example in the
data set), it may be that the bankruptcy process is necessary to shelter the
firm while that litigation can be conducted.
That chain of reasoning suggests that the reasoning of the auction
theorists is fundamentally flawed. Specifically, my analysis suggests that
their proposals, if implemented rigorously, would remove from the
bankruptcy courts the issues that only the bankruptcy process can resolve
(the points discussed in the previous section) and bring into the process the
issue that most clearly can be resolved outside of bankruptcy-selection of
the optimal purchaser and completion of a prompt sale. If the purpose 2of8
bankruptcy reform is to make the system as a whole more efficient,
those reforms might be counterproductive.
To be sure, the discussion in this section does rest in part on the sense
that-at least in the areas relevant to the data set-the process in the
bankruptcy proceedings in the set is sufficiently streamlined to be
practical. There has been a great deal of concern that the bankruptcy
process does not work well, except for the largest businesses. One concern

218. See Schwartz, supra note 215.
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has been that the process is too cumbersome for creditors. 21 9 The data set
provides some interesting evidence on that point because it is a specific
slice of reasonably large, though not public, bankrupts. The evidence
about motions to convert and appointments of trustees, for example,
220
the process.
suggests that creditors are readily capable of participating in

Similarly, as the data below (regarding the time that elapses before plan
confirmation or dismissal) indicates, this is not a process where debtors
routinely use exclusivity motions to defer the moment of reckoning for
long periods. Here, at least, the debtor is not in full control.
There also is pervasive concern about the delay inherent in small
business bankruptcies. 22 1 On that point, although different people will have
different views about what counts as prompt, the bankruptcies in the data
set for the most part proceeded relatively promptly. Figure 6 shows the
outcomes of the 66 Chapter I Is, divided among the cases in which plans
have been confirmed, those converted to Chapter 7, those dismissed, and
the cases in which proposed plans are still pending.222 Figure 7 shows the
mean time to those outcomes, which were generally considerably less than
a year.223 If the firms in the data set can move through Chapter 11 that
quickly, it is difficult to credit the notion that Chapter 11 is systematically
impractical for all but the largest publicly traded firms.
219. E.g., LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control (Parts I & 1I), supra note 3; see also I NAT'L
BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 642 (1997).
220. In the 66 Chapter 11 cases, 20 were converted to Chapter 7s and four had trustees appointed.
221. E.g., 1 NAT'L BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 219, at 613-14.
222. There are no pending cases in which plans have not been proposed.
223. The medians did not differ materially from the means that I report here. The eight pending

cases are such a small part of the data set that it seems unlikely that they ultimately will increase the
average outcome shown here substantially. Interestingly, the four reorganization plans in the
population were confirmed in much less than a year, all in the range of six to eight months.
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Figute 6: Chapter 11 Outcome$
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4. Making Chapter 7 More Effective
The last avenue for inquiry is whether bankruptcy policymakers can
learn from the benefits of the ABC experience. Although this Article is not
the place to explore that topic in detail, it is evident that the principal
comparative advantage of the ABC process is the skill of the liquidator. It
might be possible to capture much of that advantage in the bankruptcy
process by the simple device of permitting Chapter 7 bankrupts to opt for a
private trustee, with the trustee's higher fee to be paid by consenting
creditors. Chapter 11 bankrupts already have control over bankruptcy
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operations for the most part through their ability to remain in
possession. 4 It is not clear why something similar could not be
accomplished in Chapter 7.
This, of course, would not capture all of the benefits of an ABC
process because an important advantage of the ABC process is that it is
quicker than bankruptcy, and would involve the expense of participation in
the bankruptcy process. Among other things, any special Chapter 7
appointment would necessarily involve judicial involvement. It is possible,
however, that it might increase the payouts in firms that need to file for
bankruptcy and have insufficient assets to successfully navigate Chapter
11 but prefer an experienced and hands-on liquidator. Similarly, it might
allow some firms that need access to bankruptcy solely to conduct
expedited litigation before transferring assets to a third party to use a
cheaper Chapter 7 process rather than the more expensive Chapter 11
process that they use now. The data reported above-which indicate that
only a small share of the Chapter 11 cases in the data set involve "true"
reorganizations--coupled with the interviews that suggest that the high
costs of Chapter 11 drive liquidation choices 22 5 suggest that this simple
proposal might be quite beneficial.
IV. CONCLUSION

This paper has two main points. First, it argues that states can improve
the efficacy with which the assets of failed firms are redirected to
profitable uses by adopting procedures that are more hospitable to ABCs.
Those procedures, the data suggest, should redirect a substantial number
of failed firms from expensive and protracted bankruptcy proceedings to
more expeditious proceedings conducted under the protection of a state
court. The major caveat to that argument is that the system needs to be at
once attentive to the possibility of abuse and at the same time sufficiently
streamlined to be attractive to the failed firms.

224. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1107 (2000). To the extent those firms wish to employ a turnaround
professional, they of course could appoint such a person as Chief Reorganizing Officer, a common
occurrence in large-firm bankruptcies in recent years. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Secured Credit,
Control Rights and Options, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1935, 1944-45 (2004); David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-PossessionFinancing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1917-18
(2004).
225. The bankruptcy policy questions are complex. Among other things, it is not clear why in
practice it is so difficult for firms to obtain special Chapter 7 appointments under existing law. See
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, Remembering Chapter7, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, at 22.
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Second, arising out of the first, analysis of liquidation choices is an
ideal way to understand the role of bankruptcy courts in dealing with the
liquidation of failed firms. I argue here-at least for the sectors that I
examine-that bankruptcy courts have an important role in that process
but that the role is quite different from the traditional role as evidenced by
the major substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, the
most important roles of the bankruptcy court for the firms are: (a) to
provide a backstop for cases in which the parties cannot agree upon an
appropriate allocation of losses among themselves; and (b) to provide a
convenient forum for complex litigation that practicably cannot be
conducted in state courts. Similar research in other areas doubtless would
reveal other situation-specific functions of the bankruptcy courts, but the
understanding of their role for venture-backed high-tech firms is
interesting in its own right.

